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RESPONSIVE SCHOLARSHIP FROM OUTSIDE 
THE MOVEMENT 
MANNERS, METAPRINCIPLES, METAPOLITICS 
AND KENNEDY'S FORM AND SUBSTANCE 
William W. Bratton, Jr. * 
Relations between Critical Legal Studies (''CLS") and the rest of 
the legal academy have given rise to images of battle. 1 In one image, 
members of a small group of clever leftist academics arm themselves 
with esoteric European theories and set off to "delegitimate" their col­
leagues. They start a two-front war, aiming for intellectual primacy 
in the law reviews and political primacy at faculty meetings. Other 
images follow. The legal academics under attack at first ignore the 
critique. Then they become stunned and enraged as the attack's mag­
nitude increases. Finally, they counterattack. "Nihilists," they splut­
ter, as they defend their territory in the law reviews and at faculty 
meetings.2 
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
The first version of this essay was presented at the fifth Cardozo Faculty Seminar on 
Critical Legal Studies, held on June 1 3, 1984. 
A number of sources have heavily influenced me. Among them are novels of E. F.  Benson 
(comic communitarianism), George Eliot (cautionary communitarianism), and Anthony Trot­
lope (county communitarianism), and Beethoven's opera, Fidelia (altruism and freedom). 
Also, I have had the great benefit of comments from Ian MacNeil, Chuck Yablon, David 
Carlson, Paul Shupack, Steve Diamond, and Arthur Jacobson. 
I CLS has revived the slang term "trashing" to describe its critiques of conventional legal 
academic work. See generally Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293 ( 1984). The term ap­
pears to have been drawn from the radical vocabulary of 1 5  years ago. In those days, the term 
described physical action against large institutions, such as the hurling of bricks through the 
windows of universities, banks, or government departments, rather than intellectual action. 
For aggressive liberal responsive literature, see generally Schwartz, With Gun and Cam­
era Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 4 1 3  ( 1 984) (CLS movement and proponents 
described as naive, utopian, neo-Marxist, and irresponsible). 
The intellectual battle may be having ramifications at the promotion and tenure meetings 
of law faculties. On this point, compare a recently published letter of Professor Robert 
Gordon to Dean Paul Carrington, with the letter from Professor Phillip Johnson to Professor 
Paul Brest in "Of Law and the River," and Of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. Legal 
Educ. I, 1 3- 1 6, 1 8- 1 9  ( 1 985). 
2 Needless to say, all the figures in the images see themselves as innocent victims. For 
defensive statements from the CLS side, see Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, 
and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 39 1 ,  399 
& n.28 ( 1 984); for defensive statements from the liberal side, see Carrington, Of Law and the 
River, 34 J .  Legal Educ. 222, 22�28 ( 1 984) ;  for a defensive, but constructive interchange 
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These images, while crude, aptly depict much of the rhetoric and 
some of the substance of the discourse surrounding CLS. CLS has 
constructed a picture of the mindset prevalent in the contemporary 
legal academy, and has advanced a challenging critical appraisal of 
the mindset it depicts. In consequence, fundamental theoretical de­
bate now occurs in academic quarters where many theoretical as­
sumptions only recently passed as self-evident truths. 
In the CLS characterization, 3 legal academics assume that con­
flicts between the individual and society can be compromised ration­
ally, and that laws effect and embody these rational compromises. 
Legal academics also assume that legal doctrine, applied through the 
proper process of legal reasoning, correctly determines the results of 
disputes between individuals. According to CLS, most legal academ­
ics see themselves in a pair of related social roles. First, they objec­
tively review the work of legal decisionmakers, sorting out the cases 
to identify correct results and correct reasoning. Second, they serve 
as agents for the integration of political and social orders from outside 
the law, or "policies," into legal doctrine. A few less conventional, 
more theoretically inclined legal academics see themselves in a more 
reconstructive role, remaking the doctrine better to accord with lib­
eral theory. 
CLS challenges each of these legal academic assumptions and 
questions each of these legal academic functions. CLS asserts that 
individuals and society are in perpetual conflict. It also asserts that 
all attempts to resolve the conflict through law are arbitrary.4 It de­
nies the existence of a correct form of legal reasoning. It also denies 
that doctrine determines the results of cases. 5 To explain law, it looks 
beyond doctrine to the structures of moral, economic, and political 
across the lines, see the published correspondence of Professor Gordon and Dean Carrington, 
supra note I. 
3 Numerous characterizations of the conventional legal academic and his world view can 
be found in and around CLS literature. For a good, succinct version, see Trubek, Where the 
Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. L.  Rev. 575 ,  579-85 ( 1 984). 
CLS writers tend to apply the philosophical categorization of "liberal legalist" to outside 
legal scholars. By this term, CLS refers to its colleagues' theoretical roots in  Hobbes, Locke, 
and Hume. See Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 247, 256 
( 1 984). 
4 This characterization of the CLS position is derived from Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, 
Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 
36 Stan. L. Rev. 1 99, 208--09 ( 1 984); and Trubek, Empiricism, supra note 3 ,  at 579. 
5 From within CLS, see, e.g. ,  Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in 
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1 982). For an outside exposi­
tion of the Critical concept of indeterminacy, see Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: 
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thought, or "metaprinciples,"  that motivate legal decisionmakers. 6 It 
advances these explanations, not to preserve and strengthen legal doc­
trine but to deconstruct it, in order, ultimately, to facilitate goals of 
political transformation. 
Now it might be hard to find a real world legal academic per­
fectly embodying the CLS picture. The picture assembles a very fa­
miliar set of elements even so; CLS engages every other legal 
academic on one or another fundamental point. Thus do intense aca­
demic battles result from encounters between CLS and the rest of the 
legal academy. 
Yet these encounters need not always result in conflict. Contrary 
to the assumptions underlying the images of battle, the world views 
behind the discourse between CLS and others do not have a binary 
cast of "critical" and "liberal . "  Rather, gradations of opinion exist, 
allowing encounters to lead to give and take and mutual influence. 
Even legal academics doing doctrinal work can acquaint themselves 
with the CLS critique and constructively utilize it without suffering 
insult or injury. This essay describes perspectives to promote such 
cordial encounters. As a basis for discussion, it employs Duncan 
Kennedy's critique of contract law,7 as advanced in Form and Sub­
stance in Private Law Adjudication8 and Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compul­
sory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power.9 
Part I looks into the meaning of images of academic battle, con-
6 See generally Schlegel, I ntroduction, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 203, 203 ( 1 979) ("[T)here can be 
no plausible legal theory without a social theory . . . .  "); Yablon, supra note 5,  at 934 ("Criti­
cal explanation of legal decisionmaking . . .  does not view judicial motivation as separate from 
and extraneous to the structure of the doctrinal rule itself."). 
The "metaprinciples" referred to in the text are our shared patterns of thought. Ken­
nedy's usage is narrower. To Kennedy, metaprinciples are determinate deep structures of 
thought. See infra text accompanying note 22. 
7 This is done with the knowledge that Kennedy "recants" many significant elements of 
this critique in Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1 ,  1 4- 1 8  ( 1 984). The 
"Kennedy" discussed in this essay is comprised of the statements made in Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 685  ( 1 976) [hereinafter cited as 
Kennedy, Form and Substance); and Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Con­
tract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining 
Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 ( 1 982) (hereinafter cited as Kennedy, Paternalism]. No claims are 
made as to identity between this "Kennedy" and the human being, Professor Duncan Ken­
nedy of the Harvard Law School. 
s Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7. 
9 Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7 .  
CLS has singled out contract law for intensive study. Professor Roberto Unger explains 
the attraction as part of CLS's enterprise of showing the highly political content of the law: 
Classical contract theory has always proved seductive to jurists in search of a 
legal calculus that could claim to generate the impersonal rules of free human 
interaction. For the same reason, it offers the most valuable challenge to a concep-
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sidering the matter of manners in academic discourse. This discus­
sion identifies some relationships between the manners and world 
views of academics and identifies the place these relationships hold in 
the debate surrounding CLS. Part II looks into the possibility of con­
structive use of Kennedy's critique of contract law by those academics 
outside of CLS who do doctrinal work. This discussion affirms the " 
continued viability of doctrinal work in the post-Realist tradition, but 
recognizes this work's diminished theoretical respectability. The con­
temporary legal academy more and more relegates doctrinal work to 
the status of a narrow form of professional practice. Kennedy, while 
contributing significantly to this loss of status, simultaneously shows 
ways to increase both the explanatory power and practical utility of 
doctrinal work and thereby to salvage some of its academic respecta­
bility. Part III looks into the political underpinnings of the images of 
battle. To facilitate appraisal of the antiliberal theory underlying 
Kennedy's critique of contract, this discussion compares Kennedy's 
Paternalism with Professor Anthony Kronman's recent work on the 
same subject. 10 The comparison highlights a core of humanistic val­
ues that makes Kennedy's antiliberal discourse less adverse to the lib­
eralism of legal academics outside of CLS than the images of battle 
would suggest. 
I . MANNERS 
Academic discussion is a highly stylized form of social inter­
course characterized by extraordinary personal detachment .  Even so, 
when academics interact by discussing ideas, there occur the same 
sorts of conflict between self and other that occur with any other so­
cial interaction within a community. Academics integrate themselves 
with their ideas in many ways. For example, they consider fluency 
with given ideas relevant to their self-evaluations. They also draw on 
their personal experiences when formulating ideas. Sometimes they 
make association with certain ideas a mark of status in the academic 
community. And sometimes their public presentations and exchanges 
tion of the doctrine that emphasizes the continuity of legal analysis with ideologi· 
cal conflict. 
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 5 6 1 ,  6 1 8  ( 1 983).  For other 
CLS work on contract law, see Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 
94 Yale L.J. 997 ( 1 98 5); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 
829 ( 1 983); Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for 
Critical Legal Theory, 6 1  Minn. L. Rev. 60 1 ( 1 977); Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideo!· 
ogy (Book Review), 33 Stan. L. Rev. 753 ( 1 98 1 )  (reviewing P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of 
Freedom of Contract ( 1 979)). 
IO Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763 ( 1 983)  [hereinafter 
cited as Kronman, Paternalism]. 
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of ideas become competitive events. In short, whether the forum is 
the lecture hall, the seminar room, the office and corridor, or the 
pages of a journal, academic exchanges can be threatening to individ­
ual academics' self-respect. 
Manners of presentation reduce or enhance the chance of injury 
to the self-respect of those participating in academic interchanges of 
ideas. The greater the apprehension of injury, the more likely an aca­
demic audience will form unconsidered negative judgments regarding 
the substance of the idea. Manners of presentation also engage or 
alienate the stylistic sensibilities of those in the academic audience. 
As with any community, prevailing opinions regarding the manners 
of a member over time may affect the size, composition and receptive­
ness of his or her audience. Images to which such manners give rise 
even may figure into the audience's image of the idea conveyed. 
Perhaps manners should be completely beside the point in aca­
demic discourse. We can posit an ideal academic world in which this 
would be the case. Academics in this world would devote all of their 
energies to formulating, communicating, and evaluating ideas. These 
scholars would not permit their personalities to interfere with this ut­
terly substantive work. They would accord importance neither to the 
mode of an idea's communication nor to any elements of personality 
incidentally communicated with an idea. Even in a less than ideal 
academic world, the most nearly ideal academic would be so inter­
ested in ideas and would have a spirit so magnanimous that no aca­
demic discussion could offend his or her sensibilities or injure his or 
her self-esteem. Unfortunately, the real academic world and real aca­
demics tend to fall short of these ideals. As a result, manners are not 
quite beside the point in academic discourse. They can bear on the 
substance communicated. 
Highly aggressive and intensely personal manners of presentation 
are particularly likely to bear on substance. They can prompt uncon­
sidered negative judgments or otherwise alienate academic audiences. 
These dangerous characteristics are considered in tum in the follow­
ing discussion . 
A. Aggression 
Ideas can be conveyed aggressively. Sometimes aggression may 
alienate members of the audience but carries no concomitant risk of 
injury to them, as with spoken and written tub-thumping and table­
pounding and other minor assaults on the sensibilities. The risk of 
injury increases as aggression becomes attack on designated or undes­
ignated members of the audience. Such attacks occur commonly in 
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the legal academy, most notoriously in Kingsfield's contracts class, 11 
but just as aggressively on the pages of the law reviews. An idea's 
proponent may assert personal superiority for having formulated it. 
Or, a proponent may challenge directly the intellectual and moral 
worth of those in the community holding any idea but that advanced, 
notwithstanding a risk of injury to the identity of those challenged. 
The polar opposite of communication by attack is restrained and 
supportive teaching. The ideal restrained teacher combines a rigor­
ous, socratic approach with empathy towards students. This teacher 
instructs an audience of error in its thinking by engaging it on com­
mon ground. The teacher displays understanding of the set of mind 
that encompasses the erroneous idea and affirms its legitimacy. The 
teacher then points the audience to the views that have not occurred 
to it, leading it into self-criticism. Thus, the same idea that injures 
identity when employed as an instrument of attack, can advance pain­
lessly an understanding of self and the world if communicated with 
care. 
Theoretical justifications exist for both of these manners of com­
munication. Most legal academics simultaneously subscribe to both 
theories, even though the theories conflict. Happily, this contradic­
tion is hardly noticeable in academic practice as academics tailor their 
manners to suit different situations. 
The justification of attack draws on the rhetoric of individualism. 
We envision a tough academic world in which the interchange of 
ideas tends to be a rough-and-tumble affair. Those who stand up and 
speak in this world must assume the risk that those moved to respond 
will ignore social niceties. 
The justification of attack also draws on traditional academic val­
ues. In a vital academy ideas, and only ideas, can matter. Therefore, 
restrained manners confer no intrinsic benefit. Scarce human energies 
cannot be diverted from the vigorous pursuit of truth to train man­
ners protective of delicate egos. Nor is polished, caring behavior in­
herently good. Pleasing manners may obscure intellectual and moral 
deficiencies; an obnoxious and hurtful academic may have a good 
heart as well as good ideas. 
The justification of attack also has an instrumental dimension. 
Academics advancing new ideas cannot safely assume the efficacy of 
the restrained and supportive mode. The audience may not be dis­
posed to subject itself to self-criticism. Cold academic print is more 
easily ignored than the first-year contracts teacher. An attack on an 
1 1 See J. Osborne, The Paper Chase ( 1 97 1 ). The reference is to Charles W. Kingsfield, the 
novel's intimidating professor of contracts. 
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audience's thinking may be the only practical way to break through 
its indolence and complacency and to get its attention. 
Finally, professional values figure into the justification of attack. 
Attack remains a part of the advocate's craft, and training in attack 
remains a part of legal education. We can assume that those in the 
legal academy have learned to deal with it. 
The justification of restrained and supportive teaching counters 
the justification of attack. It draws on the rhetoric of community. 
Many conventions of "good manners" restrain self-expression out of 
concern for others. Academics, like other people, experience plenty 
of insecurity. Restraint in academic discussion eases these feelings of 
insecurity. It therefore should be practised out of respect for others' 
self-respect. 
The justification of restrained teaching also includes academic 
values and instrumental considerations. Insecurity, stemming from 
the aggression of other members of the academic community in the 
normal conduct of community affairs, does not, in the long run, serve 
a constructive purpose. If only ideas matter in a vital legal academy, 
then surely its members would not want to divert energy from the 
pursuit of ideas to the formulation of aggressive rhetoric. If only 
ideas matter, then the ego-suppression necessary for restraint will re­
quire little effort. In any event, the amount of energy expended in 
ego-suppression by academic speakers may be less than the amount of 
energy needed to assuage the wounds of their audiences. Restraint 
then, may be cost beneficial. Of course, restraint does disadvantage 
those introducing new ideas by making their work less noticeable. 
But this sacrifice advances communitarian goals. And the sacrifice 
lasts only for a short term because good ideas achieve currency in the 
long run. Thus, while a vital academy always will subject its mem­
bers' ideas to searching criticism, its vitality need not require the sac­
rifice of its members' human worth. 
Finally, the justification of restrained teaching rejects the adver­
sary system and its institutionalized aggression as an inappropriate 
model for the academy. Courtroom advocates do not become en­
gaged personally in the ideas they advance. 12 While they take a 
craftsman's pride in their work, they do not stake as much personal 
worth on their discourse as do academics. The attacks the advocate 
suffers bear on the client's case, rather than on his or her 
craftsmanship. 
1 2 But see Yablon, supra note 5, at 9 1 8  & n.5 (the "identification by the advocate with the 
cause being advanced sometimes resonates with religosity"). 
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B .  Personal Involvement 
This is the matter of manners bound up in the writer's choice :� 
between the first and third persons. Like aggressive and restrained 
manners, personal and impersonal manners are subject to conflicting 
theoretical justifications. We associate the personal mode with subjec-
" 
tivity, informality, flexibility, passion, and free expression. We associ- .· 
ate the impersonal mode with objectivity, formality, rigidity, reserve, 
and disciplined expression. In practice, academics inject themselves 
' 
into their work by degrees, employing both modes of expression to · ·· 
varying degrees in different situations. 
Under prevailing conventions of manners, impersonal academic 
writing has an appearance of propriety and the personal mode tends 
to be reserved to the classroom. Even so, personal writing appears in 
the law reviews. One no longer expects to hear the convention favor­
ing impersonal academic writing stated as a rule; the resemblance of 
such a rule to the formal dictates of the etiquette books of the past 
would be too close for modern sensibilities. As modern social infor­
mality becomes more customary in the law reviews, it seems less and 
less likely that academic readers will dismiss a work solely because 
the writer employs the first person and otherwise places his or her 
personality on display. At the same time, intensely personal academic 
writing will still produce some alienation in certain quarters. 
It should be noted that personal manners have no necessary affin­
ity with aggressive manners in theory or in practice. One can be ag­
gressive personally or impersonally. Restrained teaching also can be 
conducted personally or impersonally .  But personal display may en­
hance the effect of either manner of presentation. When the attacker 
commits his or her personality, the targets may be shaken even more. 
When the restrained teacher commits his or her personality, the stu­
dent may be drawn toward a more intense level of self-teaching. 
Unlike aggressive and restrained manners, personal and imper­
sonal manners have definite substantive analogues. Legal academics 
theoretically disposed to search for objective truth-whether as classi­
cal liberal legalists or modern structuralists-should be drawn to an 
impersonal style. 13 The academic's personality can only interfere 
with the effective description, analysis and communication of true 
doctrines, determinant structures and other objective realities outside 
the person. On the other hand, legal academics theoretically disposed 
to see ideas as subjective constructs should be drawn to a personal 
13 For a structuralist analysis of the relationship between structures of thought and styles 
of discourse, see Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 Stan. L Rev. 1 27 ,  1 47-49 ( 1 9 84). 
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style. To these legal academics, a sentence starting with the words 
"The law is," or "The law should be,"  dubiously asserts an objective 
certainty. Members of this group would find "I think the law should 
be," or even more relatively, "I believe the law should be," to be more 
accurate formulations. 
From this starting point, a broader subjectivist critique of the 
convention of formal legal writing can be constructed along with an 
objectivist reply. To the subjectivist, formal style protects the process 
by which vain and ideological lawmakers and scholars misrepresent 
their private value choices as the dictates of objective reality. They 
employ formal style in making ideas a means to the end of power. 
None of this will make sense to formalists and structuralists : Objec­
tive realities are, well, objective realities . This subjectivist critique at 
bottom goes to bad ideas, and in a ·free society bad ideas fall out of 
circulation irrespective of their manner of presentation . While infor­
mal style may enhance our understanding of the subjective side of 
things, it also can be subverted, less as a means to the end of power 
than as a means to the end of exhibitionistic display. 
C. Manners and CLS 
Discourse on academic manners is discourse on the theory and 
practice of community behavior and accompanying moral and instru­
mental considerations. Fortunately, no positive law figures into it: No 
professional codes of "disciplinary rules" or "ethical considerations" 
deal with this behavior. We can, of course, hypothesize a positive law 
of academic manners that fills this "gap." Such an exercise follows. 
It shows us why no such positive law exists. 
In formulating a positive law of academic manners we probably 
would find ourselves drawn to standards rather than rules. And, as 
with the "good faith" and "bad faith" of private law, we would have 
to concede that no objective calculus could determine what consti­
tutes "good manners" and "bad manners." The subjective disposition 
of the observer would figure in. Then we would posit a class of "easy 
cases" as to which all would agree. For example, all probably would 
concur in a judgment of bad manners with respect to a personal at­
tack grounded in an expose of the institutional or personal life of an­
other academic. It could be noted that even here the offending 
conduct need not be irrelevant to the legal discourse--the biographi­
cal details may say something about the genesis of the ideas under 
critique. As punishment, we could recommend pariah status; as a 
remedy, money damages. 
This positive law model works less and less neatly when applied 
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to the much larger class of cases where serious intellectual aggression 
causes alienation but only minor personal injury. The model de­
mands "yes" and "no" answers where none can be given and where 
no injuries of enormous magnitude require that complexity be disre­
garded in the interest of a public and authoritative determination. 
The rejection of positive law for these hard cases leads to the 
question whether the elaboration of any sort of collateral jurispru­
dence of academic behavior will detract from the overall success of 
the academic enterprise .  Consider again the fundamental theoretical 
contradiction that academic manners pose: While academic manners 
matter because individual self-respect matters, considerations of indi­
vidual self-respect should not impede the flow of academic discourse. 
In light of this, it may be that we should have neither law nor legalis­
tic discourse respecting academic manners at all, public or private, 
formal or informal. Not only instrumental concerns, but also good 
manners should make us reluctant ever to pronounce publicly on one 
another's manners. The prevailing reliance on the community's invis­
ible hand seems well justified. 
The following comments on CLS' manners violate this sugges­
tion of silence. But comments can be justified on the facts of the case. 
The customary silence already has been broken. The popular image 
of battle includes the image of a popular judgment of bad manners 
respecting CLS. 14 An account of this image, and a substantive rebut­
tal of the accompanymg negative judgment, do not seem 
inappropriate. 
Much CLS work employs the aggressive mode, and with reason. 
CLS advances a critique so fundamental and sophisticated that ag­
gression may be necessary in order to get the rest of the community's 
attention. It can be noted that, of all the members of the community, 
the established figures under attack by CLS have the least cause for 
insecurity. 
CLS work also tends to be intensely personal, also with reason. 
Attacking "hierarchy" is a part of the CLS program. Formal law 
review style, like formal law school education, stems from and sup­
ports the "hierarchy." Rigid, impersonal style implies authority; it 
constrains individual expression; it makes passion and outrage diffi­
cult to communicate. Furthermore, personal style complements 
CLS's substantive assertion that personal motivations have a determi­
native role in legal decisionmaking. The CLS critique tells us that the 
14 See, e .g. ,  Johnson, supra note 3, at 247 (use of the image of the late 1 960's vulgar radi­
cal); see also Schwartz, supra note I (CLS preference for and use of confrontational, uncom­
promising tactics). 
j ,, I 
I 
l 
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conventional, impersonally written doctrinal piece that synthesizes 
some cases and proposes a norm cannot achieve the objective force its 
· stylistic mode implies. Personal values, as well as reason, go into 
these normative choices. Such conventional academic exercises, 
.,. therefore, would be more honest if a more personal style were 
adopted. 
These substantive justifications of CLS style can be questioned, of 
course. As to aggression, CLS by now has the community's attention. 
1 As to personal involvement, legal scholars outside of CLS can defend 
the impersonal mode and point to the dangers of departing from it by 
drawing on liberal political precepts. To liberals, law is the individ­
ual's chief defense against the aggression of other individuals and 
groups. Law has this protective capacity only so long as lawmakers 
strive to derive it rationally and describe it objectively, despite the 
presence of subjective elements in legal discourse. If we collectively 
remit law and legal discourse to the personalities of lawmakers and 
scholars, law will lose its protective capacity. Bundles of restrictive 
legal concepts springing from a single personality do not carry the 
persuasive power of concepts derived from community traditions and 
general collective assent. And, although law has a subjective side, 
lawmakers and scholars derive authority from conscientious endeav­
ors to make the process of formulating legal directives more objective. 
Formal style advances this endeavor by encouraging the individual to 
separate himself or herself from the legal question under discussion. 
Conventions of manners that discourage the subjective formulation of 
legal assertions-disapproval of revelations of "my values" or "my 
personal experience"-create healthy incentives for lawmakers and 
scholars to look outside of themselves for answers to questions. 
Now it seems unlikely that the popular image of CLS's manners 
found its way into the community's consciousness as the result of 
widespread reflection on the meaning of aggression and personal in­
volvement in academic communication. Such reflection, after all, 
might have prevented the value judgment respecting manners from 
being reached. The image can be more plausibly explained as a defen­
sive response to the more successful segments of the critique. The 
body of CLS work questions every aspect of the conventional aca­
demic's institutional life. Fundamental defenses having been aroused, 
styles of presentation take on more than usual significance. Conven­
tional small-scale doctrinal work does not have this effect, even 
though conveyed aggressively and personally. Small-scale work 
rarely involves serious assertion of the writer's personality against the 
reader's individual autonomy. With such work, only a small number 
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of readers working in the same area have a significant personal 
in the discourse. Of course, such work can include aggressive 
injurious review of, and comment on, other work in the field. But 
this arena the right touch of aggressiveness easily can prove �-'""''"'l,a• 
to all concerned. A little intemperate behavior adds to the 
ship's enjoyment, and the conflict draws beneficial attention to 
the attacker and the targets. The fight is consensual and stylized 
academic drawing room comedy performed to gratify the actors 
amuse the audience. Aggression takes on a less pleasing aspect as t 
subject matter and audience grow in size and significance. When, as 
in CLS's case, the subject becomes the world view embedded in the 
rest of the community's consciousness, 15  heightened sensitivity to 
manners can be expected. If counteraggression or denial results, ag­
gression may have the effect of retarding serious consideration of the 
ideas communicated. 
It bears noting that legal academics from outside of CLS-mem­
bers of the Chicago School of Law and Economics, for example-also 
aggressively advance broad-ranging critiques. Yet the same popular 
behavioral image does not seem to have arisen. Several related expla­
nations may be proposed. Unlike members of CLS, Chicago School 
economists share a pool of liberal assumptions with the community 
mainstream. Their critiques, accordingly, impart a lesser theoretical 
threat. The economists also tend to employ an impersonal, formal 
style. Given the individualistic world view they sometimes propound, 
no substantive contrast highlights the occasional rough handling of 
opponents. CLS's aggressiveness toward the academic community in 
which it lives sometimes strangely contrasts with its pronouncements 
of communitarian ideals. 1 6 One suspects that CLS writers would not 
15 The phrase is adapted from Trubek, Empiricism, supra note 3, at 5 89 .  
16 The composition of the audience also must be considered in evaluating academic expres­
sion. One suspects that CLS has a particularly difficult task in addressing its published work 
so as to achieve optimal levels of communication to all of the substantially different groups 
comprising the academic audience. A point well made in one manner to an audience of CLS 
insiders may be incomprehensible or offensive to legal academic outsiders. Still a third formu­
lation might be advisable for an audience of political scientists. 
The Kennedy of Form and Substance may not be so different than the Kennedy of Roll 
Over Beethoven as first appears, and this despite the fact that much of Form and Substance is 
repudiated in Roll Over Beethoven. See Kennedy & Gabel, supra note 7,  at 1 5- 1 7, 24, 36--37.  
Form and Substance is addressed to a broad audience: Anyone past the first year of law school 
has access to it. Roll Over Beethoven can be characterized as internal conversation. Whether 
Gabel and Kennedy expected it to be accessible only to themselves or to a somewhat wider 
group within CLS is not clear. Access to outsiders is so difficult that it creates an alienating 
effect. Less easily noticed but similar failures of communication are inevitable when special­
ized academic discourse achieves general circulation. 
The presentation of the critique of contract in Form and Substance and Paternalism also 
bears comparison to the presentation of the similar critique of contract in Unger, supra note 9. 
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deny the discrepancy's existence, but would advance instrumental 
justifications. 
Finally, and most importantly, the image of battle obscures the 
presence of exemplary works of restrained teaching in the CLS canon. 
Form and Substance and Paternalism are two such works. They make 
the same challenge to other academics' world views as does other CLS 
work. But they make the challenge gently, communicating respect 
for, and understanding of, the reader's positions. Significantly, in 
these works Kennedy refrains from making explicit his judgments re­
garding the legitimacy of the work and world views of others. By 
leaving the judging to the mind and conscience of the reader, he ad­
vances academic values well worth consideration. 
II .  MET A PRINCIPLES 
The following part of this essay describes the critique of contract 
in Kennedy's Form and Substance and Paternalism, and elaborates its 
bearing on the conventional academic enterprise of finding the law. 
This discussion is particularized : It isolates only a few of the many 
concepts set forth in these multifaceted works, and relates them only 
to one of the many forms of academic enterprise. The discussion 
highlights Kennedy's potential field of influence within the legal acad­
emy's most traditional quarters. Thus, it aspires to institutional sig­
nificance, rather than significance as contracts jurisprudence. 
A. Kennedy's Contract Critique and Doctrinal Scholarship 
Kennedy challenges the conventional assumption that contract 
doctrine determines the results of contract cases. Doctrine may influ­
ence results in easy cases. But, says Kennedy, easy cases are uncom­
mon. Pervasive "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities" in the "elaborated 
body of law," 1 7  tend to give rise to hard cases. As to those cases, the 
The abstract "expanded doctrine" presented by Unger is alienating and vaguely threatening to 
the uninitiated conventional academic. Kennedy's work realizes expanded doctrine in a way 
more easily comprehended by conventional academics. Kennedy speaks in familiar language 
and employs lawyerly conventions even as he participates in a subversive enterprise. 
17 Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 5 8 1 .  But see the explanation of the significance 
of the distinction between easy cases and hard cases in Heller, supra note 1 3, at 1 73-74 n .81 :  
Easy cases are those in which concrete outcomes clearly can be derived by apply­
ing the legitimating principles of the legal structure. Hard cases are those excep­
tional or aberrational situations in which results are not so easily derived. Law 
students encounter only hard cases since, presumably, they are more challenging. 
But the ideological value or meaning of the legal order is contained in the structure 
and its derivative easy case. 
I n  practice the legal system depends on the existence of easy cases of a differ­
ent type. A case is easy when particular settled practices are reproduced across 
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doctrine leaves decisionmakers wide latitude. The doctrine 
to hard cases reduces to conflicting "stereotypical policy arguments ' ' 
or "rhetorical modes . ' '  1 8  Sophisticated decisionmakers 
choice in deciding hard cases by manipulating these conflicting pieces 
of doctrine to suit their impulses. Since doctrine does not determine 
the results of hard cases, it has no power to explain them. 
Having rejected the adequacy of doctrinal explanations for the·"· 
results achieved in contract cases, Kennedy advances explanations in
'
.·. 
terms of the deeper structures of thought, or "metaprinciples," that: 
constitute and determine the impulses of decisionmakers. These, he ' 
says, partake of a fundamental contradiction. Individuals and their 
communities engage in perpetual and unresolvable conflict; and in 
" 
each individual coexists conflicting individualistic and altruistic nor­
mative visions. "Metaprinciples" are comprised of these conflicting 
political, social, and moral values. 1 9 Kennedy characterizes individu­
alism this way: 
The essence of individualism is the making of a sharp distinction 
between one's interests and those of others, combined with the be­
lief that a preference in conduct for one's own interests is legiti­
mate, but that one should be willing to respect the rules that make 
it possible to coexist with others similarly self-interested. The form 
of conduct associated with individualism is self-reliance. 20 
He characterizes the opposing metaprinciple of altruism this way: 
The essence of altruism is the belief that one ought not to indulge a 
sharp preference for one's own interest over those of others. Altru­
ism enj oins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be merciful. It 
has roots in culture, in religion, ethics and art, that are as deep as 
those of individualism. 21 
Individualism, says Kennedy, explains the results of many con­
tract cases. Contract decisionmakers motivated by individualism 
trust in market regulation and justify their decisions by drawing on 
devices such as classical interpretive literalism and the policy of trans­
actional certainty. Altruism, says Kennedy, explains the results of 
many other contract cases. Contract decisionmakers motivated by al­
truism intervene against market failure and justify their decisions by 
time without theoretical reexamination. But the heart of legal critique is to show 
that there are no easy cases in the sense that practice flows directly from legitimat­
ing principles. 
1 8  Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 5 8 1 .  See also Kennedy, Form and Substance, 
supra note 7, at 1723-24 ("[Flor each pro argument there is a con twin.") .  
1 9 See Trubek, supra note 3,  at 604, 609; Yablon, supra note 5, at 934-36. 
20 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 7 1 3. 
21 Id. at 1 7 1 7. 
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drawing on devices such as flexible standards, contextualized interpre­
tation and fairness theories. Kennedy does not tell us, however, what 
it is that causes individualistic motivations to determine the results of 
some cases and altruistic motivations to prevail in others. He recog­
nizes that his explanation falls short of predictive calculus: 
Like Llewellyn's famous set of contradictory "canons on statutes," 
the opposing positions seem to cancel each other out. Yet some­
how this is not always the case in practice. Although each argu­
ment has an absolutist, imperialist ring to it, we find that we are 
able to distinguish particular fact situations in which one side is 
much more plausible than the other. The difficulty, the mystery, is 
that there are no available metaprinciples to explain just what it is 
about these particular situations that make them ripe for 
resolution. 22 
Kennedy's critique revives, brings to date, and transforms the 
Realists' critique of classical contract law.23 Classical contract theo­
rists claimed that contract doctrine was derived through correctly 
reasoned application of the principle of freedom of contract. To 
them, all of contract could be justified as a means of protecting the 
autonomy of the individual in society. Realists pointed out the inde­
terminate relationship between the concept of freedom of contract 
and the results of contract cases. Some Realists also denied the au­
tonomy of legal argument from general moral, economic, and political 
discourse, 24 and emphasized the determinative force of personal moti­
vation in legal decisionmaking.25 Kennedy repeats all of this, disre­
gards many other Realist points, and adds his overarching image of 
perpetual contradiction and his explanatory meta principles of individ­
ualism and altruism. In so doing, he transforms the Realists' explana­
tory concept. Where some Realist work dismissed doctrines as 
irrelevant, ex post rationalizations of emotionally determined acts, 
Kennedy emphasizes the significance of doctrines as parts of larger, 
22 Id .  at 1 723-24 (footnote omitted). 
23 Kennedy acknowledges his Realist antecedents. See id. at 1 73 1 -32; Kennedy, Paternal­
ism, supra note 7, at 578 .  
In this essay, "classical" contract law is the construct of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, 
memorialized in the Restatement of Contracts (1932). Post-Realist contract law is the revision 
of Corbin, Fuller, Gilmore, Braucher, and Farnsworth, memorialized in the Restatement (Sec­
ond) of Contracts (19 8 1 ). 
24 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 724, 1 73 1 -32, 1762. 
25 See, e.g., Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 603 
(1943); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1222, 1238-39 (1931); see also, Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in 
The Politics of Law 1 8 , 2 8  (D. Kairys ed.  1 982) ("[T]here is no 'inner' core of free, autono­
mous bargaining to be protected from 'outside' state action; the inner and outer dissolve into 
each other."). 
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'1 not necessarily consistent, systems of values.26 Kennedy directs his critique against post-Realist theories that 
recognize the existence of conflict between individual and society, and 
advocate its resolution through interest-balancing jurisprudence. Says 
Kennedy, no theoretical core from which resolutions of conflicts ra­
tionally can be derived has been devised. Furthermore, no such over­
arching conflict-resolving metaprinciple will be found in the world as 
we know it since all philosophical inquiries lead back to the void of 
perpetual contradiction. 27 
Kennedy also directs his cntlque against post-Realist contract 
doctrine. This, he says, ameliorates some of classicism's individualist 
excesses but does not differ from it in substance. Newer doctrinal 
notions, such as inequality of bargaining power, are just as indetermi­
nate and incoherent in application as the classical notion of freedom 
of contract.28 In Paternalism Kennedy offers a detailed economic and 
political contextualization of cases employing the inequality-of-bar­
gaining-power rationale. This shows persuasively that the altruism 
metaprinciple, particularly manifested in redistributivist and paternal­
ist impulses, better explains the set of decisions and better isolates the 
complex economic questions the cases raise than does the notion of 
inequality of bargaining power. 29 
26 For a description of the differences between the Realists' concept of legal explanation 
and the CLS metaprinciple, see Yablon, supra note 5, at 934-35 (CLS has found "doctrine 
worthy of serious study."  The Realists rejected "any link between doctrine and motives for 
judicial action."). 
27 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7,  at 1 774-76; see Hutchinson & Monahan, 
supra note 4, at 208- 11.  
Kennedy also rejects the proffer of efficiency as a conflict-resolving metaprinciple. The 
efficiency norm, says Kennedy, cannot legitimate an area of law such as contract because its 
application always presupposes the existence of one or another economic order. Kennedy, 
Form and Substance, supra note 7,  at 1 762-64. Furthermore, efficiency works neatly only in 
tightly closed models. I t  fails to survive the t ransfer to real world conditions because its pres­
ence or absence simply does not admit of empirical proof. Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 
7, at 597-601 .  
I ronically, Kennedy proves himself to be one of the grand masters of microeconomic 
modeling in the contemporary legal academy even as he rejects efficiency as an explanatory 
metaprinciple. Compare id. at 604-- 1 4  with Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Mar­
kets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 
1 387, 1 389 ( 1 983). 
28 See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 7 3 1-32;  Kennedy, Paternalism, 
supra note 7, at 578-81. 
Kennedy also rejects capitalist class domination as an explanation for modern contract. 
Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 72 1-22. For an opposing view from inside 
CLS, see Gabel & Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in The Politics of Law 1 72, 1 78-8 1 (D. 
Kairys ed. 1 982). 
29 The notion of inequality of bargaining power, says Kennedy, conceives of equality in 
terms of power relationships among contracting parties operative inside the narrow doctrinal 
framework of contractual assent. The decisionmaker rectifies an uneven balance of power by 
·J l 
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A personal moral vision pervades Kennedy's root-and-branch 
critique. 30 He values altruism and wants more of it in private law. He 
hopes his critique will contribute to an altered approach to contract 
decisionmaking under which altruist presumptions displace prevailing 
individualist presumptions. He believes this will result in better deci­
sionmaking if this happens, even though we remain subject to the fun­
damental contradiction. 3 1  
At this point, one can imagine a conventional academic com­
menting that Kennedy's cr_itique has no apparent connection with 
normal scholarly enterprise. He or she might argue that inspecting 
decisions for individualism and altruism appears a simple-minded ex­
ercise when compared with conventional intuitive distillation of subtle 
doctrinal statements from unruly groups of cases. The former en­
deavor, says this conventional academic, amounts to simplified polit­
ical science, of interest only to political scientists. The latter, while 
making no pretense to social or political theoretical significance, at 
least serves the needs of judges and lawyers. 
But appearances can be deceiving. Kennedy can be drawn on to 
renew and improve doctrinal work directed to professional audiences. 
We can see this by exploring the possiblities opened by Kennedy's 
expanded notions of doctrinal study and comparing the products of 
scholarship under the conventional model. Such a comparative exer­
cise follows, undertaken in the illustrative context of the contract law 
good faith duty. 
The good faith duty remains at a nascent stage of development. 
Its indeterminacy, therefore, still commands general recognition. De­
spite this, conventional scholarship respecting it operates under the 
conventional synthesis paradigm-that is, it works toward a general 
and consistent statement of the doctrine meaningful in determining 
decisions. Good faith being new and vague, the expectation is that a 
synthesis of it ultimately will resemble the synthesis of the substantial 
imposing contract terms, thereby redistributing power from the strong to the weak party. 
Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 6 1 5 . Kennedy shows that this doctrine does not effec­
tively isolate the instances when a compulsory term will truly benefit the distributive interests 
of the weak party. His models of redistributive situations show that multitudinous economic 
factors-particularly market structure and bargaining costs-need to be considered before any 
redistributive effect can be projected. Id. at 6 1 5 , 6 1 8. The equality concept obscures a redis­
tributive objective, but achieves only mild redistributions of wealth on a scattershot basis with­
out threatening society's basic arrangements. "It  nonetheless gives a very good feeling," says 
Kennedy. ld. at 621. 
30 The charge of nihilism, sometimes leveled against CLS work, applies to neither Form 
and Substance nor Paternalism. 
3 1 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1777-78 .  Roberto Unger says more or 
less the same thing. See Unger, supra note 9, at 639-4 1 .  
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performance doctrine. Thus, it will be manifested in a standard five 
or six factors for application in context, rather than in a rule. The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts takes a first crack at this synthesis 
of good faith as follows: 
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith 
in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be 
justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or 
may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than 
honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, 
but the following types are among those which have been recog­
nized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack 
of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect per­
formance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with 
or failure to cooperate in the other party's  performance. 32 
To assist in appraising the professional utility of the Restate­
ment's synthesis, let us imagine an associate attorney undertaking a 
memorandum of law recommending a course of action to a client ex­
periencing difficulty in a contractual relationship. The Restatement 
32 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 comment d ( 1 9 8 1  ). 
The Restatement (Second) synthesis derives from Summers, "Good Faith" in General 
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195 
( 1968). There Professor Summers formulated an "excluder" analysis of good faith. Under this 
analysis, a judge determines good faith by "focus[ing] on the forms of bad faith ruled out in 
previous opinions and work[ing] from (those] opinions either directly or by way of analogy." 
ld. at 207. Once a body of holdings is created which describe what conduct is in bad faith, 
there should be "certainty" and ultimately, a rule will be created. Id. at 264-65.  Furthermore, 
it is "easy enough to formulate examples of bad faith," and "good faith takes on definite . . .  
meanings by way of contrast." ld.  at 263-64. Summers made out a noninclusive list of bad 
faith actions which eventually found its way into the Restatement (Second) § 205 comment d. 
These included, "negotiating without serious intent to contract, . . . entering a transaction 
without intending to perform . . . , evading the spirit of a transaction, Jack of diligence, will­
fully rendering only substantial performance, and abusing the power to specify terms or to 
determine compliance . . .  [as well as] interfering with or failing to cooperate in the other 
party's performance." Summers,  supra, at 2 1  � 1 7. For a confirmation of the derivation of this 
Restatement list, see Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Con­
ceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 8 1 0  ( 1 982). In the later piece, Summers "suspect[s] that it is 
now possible to develop useful lists of factors generally relevant to the determination of good­
faith performance in a number of . . .  contexts." I d. at 833 .  
Professor Burton seeks a determinate formulation by reconstructing good faith through a 
cost analysis. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369 ( 1 980). Under this analysis, bad faith is the recapturing of "fore­
gone opportunities." I d. at 387. A "foregone opportunity" is an objectively determined alter­
native the promisor did not choose at formation. Id. at 373. The jury decides whether the 
obligor abused his or her discretion by recapturing a foregone opportunity. ld. at 3 89. 
In contrast, Professor Gillette recommends that good faith not be given the status of an 
independent cause of action precisely because it is vague and often subjectively applied. See 
Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1 9 8 1  Duke L.J. 6 1 9. Even "imbued 
with its utility as an 'excluder, ' good faith may mean different things to different [people] ." Id. 
at 643 (footnote omitted). 
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will help this practitioner only with the first paragraph of the "legal 
discussion" segment of the memorandum. It tells the practitioner 
that conduct injurious to the interests of other parties may provide 
occasions for imposition of the duty. And it tells the practitioner that 
decisionmakers may draw freely on the entire realm of private law 
doctrinal and policy notions in justifying their decision. Any notions 
of fault, culpability, transaction costs, equality of bargaining power, 
transaction structure, or the parties' status, transactional purpose, or 
intent (actual or imputed) may be advanced as decisional determi­
nants in a good faith case consistent with the Restatement.33 The Re­
statement's doctrinal summary has less utility as the practitioner 
proceeds into the memorandum. The practitioner's client wants an 
appraisal of legal risks. To provide it, the practitioner needs to know 
about decisionmaker behavior patterns the client likely would en­
counter were the matter to be litigated. Synthesized case law de­
scribes only the grammar and vocabulary of the cases' rhetoric, 
filtering out any motivational volatility. 34 It thus provides little assist­
ance with risk appraisal. 
We compare a hypothetical study of good faith case law under­
taken pursuant to Kennedy's paradigm. This study would scrutinize 
each case for the intuitive leap taken by the judge in determining the 
degree of altruistic duty appropriate in the context. 35 It would view 
doctrinal statements as ex post rationalizations of these intuitive deci­
sions, interesting nonetheless for what they tell us about the political 
composition of the decisionmakers. The inquiry would be relational. 
With Macneil, 36 Kennedy tells us that pure exchange relations tend to 
prompt individualistic responses, and that the sharing and sacrifice 
arising among the parties in more relational situations tend to prompt 
altruistic decisions. The study would survey fact patterns, isolating 
3 3  The conventional law review articles on the subject do little to clarify matters. See supra 
note 32.  
3 4  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 ( 1 9 8 1 )  good faith duty represents an ab­
stract, almost academic commitment to altruism. By its own terms, the duty applies to every 
contract. And yet a survey of any series of reporters on the law library shelf containing con­
tract cases will show that there still occurs plenty of Willistonian decision making which fails to 
take the good faith duty into account. Kennedy's conflicting metaprinciples better account for 
these phenomena than do generally phrased doctrinal pronouncements on the parameters of 
the duty. 
3 5  See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 72 1 ,  1 759-60. 
36 Kennedy acknowledges a debt to Macneil. See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra 
note 7, at 1 7 1 8 .  For views of Macneil published shortly before Form and Substance, see, e.g. ,  
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal . L. Rev. 69 1 , 735-805 ( 1 974). Macneil's 
theories nevertheless place him very much outside of CLS. See, e.g., Macneil, Values in Con­
tract: Internal and External, 78  Nw. U . L. Rev. 340, 409 ( 1 983) (relational theory accepts the 
perpetual contradiction). 
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the interplay of the decisionmakers' motivational dispositions with re- _ · ,.,. 
lational considerations such as the degree of communal involvement, , 
the parties' moral fault or virtue, and the benefit granted or withheld · "· � 
in connection with the particular decision.37 Presumably, some rela­
tionship between relational characteristics and "good faith" outcomes _ 
would emerge. 
The study envisioned would be as much "behaviorist" as "criti- · 
cal" or "political." "Realistic" may be the best fitting single term. 
The study would find what the law is by examining what deci­
sionmakers do and simultaneously say about it. The study would be 
more useful to practitioners than scholarship limited by the synthesis 
paradigm. Information and analysis respecting decisionmaker moti­
vations and relational contexts facilitate the projection of legal risks. 
By laying out metaprinciples, we tell practitioners useful things about 
the probability of given results in given cases. 
The legal academic who puts Kennedy's critique to use in this or 
some similar way may find reason to be grateful. Not only do Ken­
nedy's structural theories restore some theoretical respectability to 
doctrinal scholarship, but they do so without requiring that the doc­
trinal scholar undertake substantial professional retraining. This aca­
demic may find Kennedy's theories easier to grasp and employ than 
the competing theories of the law and economics schools. And, un- 1 
like the law and economics literature, Kennedy's work reaffirms the l.· 
value of doing what legal academics traditionally have done best: 
studying judicial opinions. Even though Kennedy makes the uncon- �li ventional demand that "there can be no plausible legal theory without 
a social theory,"38 he does not also demand an academic practice in- j 
volving empirical research into law and society, which most legal aca- i 
demics are unequipped and unwilling to undertake. 39 Work under I 
Kennedy's theory requires training in doctrinal discourse. A political 
scientist or sociologist would have difficulty succeeding at it without a 
legal education. By thus advancing a scholarship that builds upon the 
traditional legal academic discipline,40 Kennedy protects the legal 
academy's traditional institutional position. 
It also should be noted that nothing in Form and Substance and 
Paternalism asserts that meaningful scholarship must focus on deci-
3 7  See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7,  at 1 7 1 8 . 
3 8 See, e.g . ,  id. at 1 702, 17 1 2 ,  1724, 1776. The phrase comes from Schlegel, Introduction, 
supra note 6, at 203. 
39 See Trubek, supra note 3,  at 579-88 for a description of the tradition of empirical studies 
of law. 
40 See Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance, 6 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 947, 948 ( 1 985). 
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sionmaker values. Other relational or social inquiries-studies of reg­
ulatory structures and empirical settings, for example--can be fitted 
into Kennedy's critical picture. Decisionmakers' individualist and al­
truist values are sensitive to pictures of reality, pictures that often are 
stereotyped and distorted in legal literature and conventional legal 
imaginations. Kennedy presumably would admit that scholarly re­
constructions of these pictures can better structure the channels in 
which legal motivations flow. 
If the Kennedy of Form and Substance and Paternalism threat­
ens anyone in the legal academy, it is the unreconstructed doctrinal­
ist. This is the anti-Realist academic writer of glorified student notes. 
This academic accepts doctrine as the apolitical determinant of the 
results of cases, even while silently employing politics to critique doc­
trine's formulation and deployment in judicial opinions. Kennedy im­
plicitly asserts that this work lacks legitimacy. But it should be noted 
that Kennedy here "delegitimates" not the law itself, but a genre of 
legal scholarship. It also should be noted that Kennedy's attack pri­
marily goes against this scholarship's institutional status as explana­
tory theory. The law and economics literature and the law and 
society literature each makes substantially similar implicit challenges, 
albeit while advancing different explanatory concepts .4 1  
The Kennedy of Form and Substance bids the unreconstructed 
doctrinalist to abandon claims to status as a high theorist and to ac­
cept the indeterminacy of doctrine and the significance of deci­
sionmaker values in its creation and application. Presumably, once 
the duly chastened doctrinalist does this, he or she legitimately can 
return to doctrinal work. The practitioner audience for doctrinal dis­
course will be there as before, looking to the doctrinalist academic 
and the treatise writer to do the ongoing job of keeping the doctrine 
organized and translating political, social and economic ideas into 
doctrinal terms. To these practitioners, the doctrinal academic proba­
bly will remain a theorist. At the same time, academic theorists will 
view the doctrinalists' work as an exercise ancillary to practice. Ironi­
cally, the job of conveying the ideas of academic theorists to the prac­
titioners ultimately may fall to the doctrinalist academic. 
B. Caveats 
Two significant qualifications limit the foregoing commendation 
of Kennedy's critique to doctrinalist contract scholars. First, the ex­
planatory power of the metaprinciples of Form and Substance tends to 
4 J For a fuller discussion of the role explanatory concepts play in any particular school of 
thought, see Yablon, supra note 5,  at 925-29.  
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decrease as private relationships become more complex. Second, at 
some points, Kennedy's antiliberal objectives so influence his legal 
analysis as to place his explanations of legal structure out of touch 
with any reality within the purview of most scholars. The following 
discussion details these caveats. 
1 . Group Associations 
In Form and Substance Kennedy asserts that the metaprinciples 
of individualism and altruism explain the legal governance of private 
relations more complex than those dealt with under the traditional 
categories of contract and tort law. He suggests, for example, that an 
individualistic corporate law appeared in the late nineteenth century, 
paralleling the appearance of individualistic contract law. This must 
mean that Kennedy would explain the late nineteenth century cessa­
tion of close state law scrutiny of corporate affairs in terms of the 
notion of individual self-responsibility.42 Such an explanation cer­
tainly captures significant characteristics of late nineteenth century 
corporate law. The courts and legislatures of that era did remit share­
holders, workers, and consumers to self-protection in their dealings 
with corporate entities. 
But we cannot fully explain the emergence of modern corpora­
tion law by references to legal decisionmakers' notions of individual 
self-responsibility. Closer focus on late nineteenth century develop­
ments respecting internal corporate relationships shows us a system in 
which individual self-responsibility was anything but the norm.  Inter­
nal corporate life of that era centered on community support for the 
leadership and individual sacrifice for the interests of the collective 
enterprise. Corporate law facilitated this corporate-community soli­
darity by protecting management discretion and limiting management 
accountability to individuals dealing with the corporate entity.43 In 
42 At least, absent evidence of a lack of free will. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra 
note 7,  at 1 7 30. The subject comment is made in the course of Kennedy's discussion of 1 9th­
century contract law : 
I d .  
[T]he rules of contract law sti l l  represented a moral as well as a practical vision, 
but that vision was no longer perceptibly altruist. The new premise was that peo­
ple were responsible for themselves unless they could produce evidence that they 
lacked free will in the particular circumstances . . . .  
We could trace a similar process of development in torts or property or corpo­
rate law. In each case, there was a central individualist concept representing a 
substantial l imitation on the total freedom of the state of nature. 
43 See generally J. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Laws of the 
United States 1 7 80-- 1 970 ( 1 970) (accounting for the emergence of management-protective cor­
porate law). Says Hurst: "Corporation law early favored business arrangements which central-
1985] MANNERS, METAPRINCIPLES, METAPOLITICS 893 
order to explain this management-protective corporate law in Ken­
nedy's terms, we must make recourse to his altruism metaprinciple, 
rather than to individualism. That is, the lawmakers' altruism toward 
the management group fostered a corporate law privileging collective 
interests over individual rights. And, fully consistent with the analy­
sis of Form and Substance, the lawmakers manifested this collectivist 
regime in standards, rather than rules. 44 
Unfortunately, this analysis of early modem corporate law in in­
dividualist/altruist terms only begins to relate the body of legal deci­
sions in question to the determinant social and political visions of the 
decisionmakers. This individualist/altruist analysis isolates some fun­
damental concepts respecting the appropriateness of mutual depen­
dence as instantiated in corporate law.45 Corporate law also 
instantiates particularized concepts respecting political and social 
control of powerful business entities. It may be that the latter group 
played the more significant causative role in late nineteenth century 
decisionmaking. 
Similar caveats must be entered against employment of the 
meta principles of individualism and altruism to explain contemporary 
corporate law phenomena. One of the great contemporary corporate 
law issues, the fiduciary duties of management groups threatened with 
takeovers, can be taken as an example. One strain of discourse on this 
issue advances agency-cost jurisprudence against traditional judicial 
ized decision making, gave it considerable assurance of tenure, and armed it  for vigorous 
maneuver." I d. at 25 .  This characterization is comprised of both individualism and altruism. 
44 Those standards overrode the freedom of parties doing business to alter them contractu­
ally. See id. at 56. 
45 Professor Gerald Frug's recent work in the corporate area does not employ the 
metaprinciples of individualism and altruism. Frug looks at the larger structural picture of 
law and ideology constituting and legitimating large corporate bureaucracies. He considers 
the different theories that purport to contain corporate power even as they protect it. H e  
shows that each such theory attempts simultaneously t o  impose objective limitations o n  corpo­
rate power and to protect subjective spheres of self-expression both inside and outside of the 
corporation. He asserts that the theories fail successfully to accomplish this subjective/objec­
tive dichotomy and therefore are inadequate. Frug himself would like to reconstruct social life 
by dismantling corporate and other bureaucracies and substituting other forms of human rela­
tionships. See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1 276 
( 1984). 
Professor Roberta Romano would term Frug a "participationist": 
The participationist ideal is organized around small nonhierarchical groups that 
display, as the name denotes, high levels of member participation in all decisions. 
This vision is organic and not individualist because it perceives the group, which 
may be the entire community, as the elemental political and social unit. The pri­
mary goal is the de(;entralization of decisionmaking. 
Romano, Meta politics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923, 946 ( 1 984). The 
Kennedy of Form and Substance and Paternalism also can be so catagorized. But cf. Unger, 
supra note 9. 
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tolerance of self-protective management conduct. Conflicting indivi 
ualistic and altruistic motivations can be detected behind the legal 
guments on both sides. The judicial position reflects an al 
sense of interprofessional solidarity.46 The judge knows that 
employees, academics, judges, and other government workers ha 
tenure systems, and that today a good faith contract duty protects 
even untenured employees; the judge, thus, feels that business execu­
tives also should have some sort of tenure. The academic attack on 
decisionmaking prompted by these feelings in effect recommends 
destabilization of a longstanding system of executive tenure by the 
play of market forces. This position can be characterized as 
individualistic. 
These explanations in terms of individualism and altruism tell us 
less and less about the determinants of this area of the law as we de­
velop the picture of the conflicting interests at stake. Massive fights 
over slices of corporate pies bring the interests of many groups into 
simultaneous conflict. These interests, belonging to groups and sub­
groups of managers, shareholders, employees, and creditors, go in and 
out of alignment as the posture of each battle changes. So many dif­
ferent individualistic and altruistic responses can be provoked by the 
many stimuli involved that employment of Kennedy's metaprinciples 
results in a sort of explanatory indeterminacy. Suppose the legal re­
gime tilts to favor target shareholders. We could say that it thereby 
imposes a duty of sharing to the benefit of the larger corporate com­
munity. But, because this duty of sharing denies management tenure, 
it has a concomitant individualistic aspect. If we reverse the hypo­
thetical and posit a legal regime tilting toward target management, we 
see sharing and self-reliance imposed on target stockholders for the 
benefit of a larger, but differently conceived corporate entity. Again, 
we can talk of both individualism and altruism. In neither case have 
we learned much about what determined the legal result. 
We would do better with explanations of this and other areas of 
corporate law that center on interest groups, wealth, and power. The 
46 The judicial position is set forth in  a number of well-known opinions. See, e.g. ,  Panter v .  
Marshall Field & Co. ,  646 F.2d 27 1 ,  295-97 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 4 5 4  U . S .  1092 ( 1 9 8 1 ); 
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93, vacated on other grounds, 629 F .2d 302 (3d Cir. 
1 9 80), cert. denied, 450 U.S.  999 ( 1 9 8 1  ); Cheff v. Mathes, 4 1  Del. Ch. 494, 508, 1 99 A.2d 548,  
556-57 ( 1 964). 
The agency-cost critique has an extensive literature. See, e .g . ,  Bebchuk, The Case for 
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1 028 ( !  982); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 
1 1 6 1  ( 1 98 1 ); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Wel­
fare, 36 Bus. Law. 1 733 ( 1 9 8 1  ); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 8 1 9 ( 1 9 8 1 ). 
· j  
l 
l 
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dollars and cents stakes of  the regulatory alternatives respecting the 
market for corporate control are high and plain to see. Thus, it is 
plausible to explain legal decisionmaking in this area in instrumental­
ist terms. Redistributive motives against management power also 
may be involved, and such motives would be comprised of complex 
mixtures of individualism and altruism. As Kennedy recognizes in 
Paternalism, altruism and redistributivism need not be concurrent: A 
duty of sharing imposed on the weak may stem from altruism, even 
while retarding the cause of equal distribution of wealth.47 
Competitive individualistic and altruistic motivations most per­
suasively explain decisionmaking respecting simple private relation­
ships. Despite Kennedy's contrary assertion, Form and Substance 
impliedly assumes that legal structures respecting group associations 
build on a basis of altruism. From this beginning point, Form and 
Substance goes on to advance the proposition that the altruism of the 
law of group relations may be applied aggressively with respect to 
simpler, more fully voluntary transactions. Corporate law, a product 
and constituent of group relations, does not involve the same conflicts 
between individualsm and altruism Kennedy identifies in Form and 
Substance .  Corporations give us not only individuals in conflict with 
individuals, but individuals and groups in conflict with one another 
over collective interests in corporate entities and corporate collectivi­
ties in conflict with society. While corporate doctrine is as subject as 
any other doctrine to criticism for incoherence and indeterminacy, 
individualism and altruism at best only begin an explanation. 
2.  The Substantive Meaning of Form and Kennedy's 
Political Agenda 
In Form and Substance, Kennedy observes an association of rules 
with individualism, and standards with altruism; he then proposes an 
explanation therefor. In so doing, he makes a number of valuable 
observations respecting the private law decisionmaking process. But 
here Kennedy simultaneously acts as a designer of transformative 
political tools . Legal academics not within CLS, therefore, have rea­
son to beware of these theories. 
Kennedy begins with observations concerning classical and neo-
classical contract law: 
There is a strong analogy between the arguments that lawyers 
make when they are defending a "strict" interpretation of a rule 
and those they pui forward when they are asking a judge to make a 
rule that is substantively individualist. Likewise, there is a rhetori-
47 Kennedy, Patemaiism, supra note 7, at 584. 
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cal analogy between the arguments lawyers make for "relaxing the 
rigor" of a regime of rules and those they offer in support of sub­
stantively altruist lawmaking. The simplest of these analogies is at 
the level of moral argument. Individualist rhetoric in general em­
phasizes self-reliance as a cardinal virtue. . . . 
In the formal dispute about rules and standards, this argu­
ment has a prominent role in assessing the seriousness of the over­
and underinclusiveness of rules.48 
So far as concerns classical and post-Realist contract, these are accu­
rate observations.49 But Kennedy wants the point to carry as an abso­
lute. He puts arguments in favor of rules into a lockstep with 
arguments in favor of individualist substance: 
[B]oth reject result orientation in the particular case in favor of an 
indirect strategy. They both claim that the attempt to achieve a 
total ordering in accord with the lawmaker's purpose will be 
counterproductive. . . . In short, the arguments for rules over 
standards is inherently noninterventionist, and it is for that reason 
inherently individualist. 50 
Problems arise when we attempt to employ these "inherent" val­
ues as metaprinciples explaining the conduct of decisionmakers. We 
very quickly find that the complexity of human motivations limits the 
practical application of the theory. Consider a decisionmaker apply­
ing venerable contract rules that always have had an altruistic colora­
tion, such as those concerning capacity and liquidated damages. The 
capacity rules can be applied to release a sophisticated adolescent. 
The liquidated damages rule can be applied to avoid a heavily negoti­
ated penalty clause. In either case, the decisionmaker so acting may 
have to overcome a distaste for upsetting the justified expectations of 
the losing party. When the decisionmaker applies the rules harshly 
despite this distaste, the operative motivation may be an altruistic 
concern for the integrity of a total order protective of children or in­
tolerant of private penalties. Although the decisionmaker applies the 
rules harshly, he or she gets no individualistic satisfactions from the 
exercise. 5 1  
Altruistic contract doctrine, then, can be manifested in rules. 
48 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7 ,  at 1 738-39. This point is applied to the 
governance of the welfare system in Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare 
System, 92 Yale L.J. 1 1 98 ,  1 223-54 ( 1 983). 
49 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 74 1 .  
50 Id. at 1 74 1 .  
5 !  Kennedy, i n  contrast, characterizes such an application of the capacity rules as individu­
alistic. Id. at 1 739-40. In  another example, Kennedy notes that the individualistic doctrines 
of institutional competence and political questions were invented by altruists for instrumental 
ends, prior to the Second World War. Id. at 1 753 .  
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The point seems counterintuitive at first. But a quick look at the 
Code of Federal Regulations bears it out. Prolix and complex bodies 
of rules are the everyday tools of today's collectivist lawmakers. 
Nothing p�events the lawmakers of the future from carrying this 
bureaucratized system further into regulation of individual business 
relationships. 
None of this would come as news to Kennedy. He admits at the 
conclusion of Form and Substance that " [i]n practice, the choice be­
tween rules and standards is often instrumental to the pursuit of sub­
stantive objectives."52 If we read his rigid analogy between rules and 
individualism together with this admission, there emerges less an in­
sight into the wellsprings of decisionmaker behavior than a technical 
observation concerning the operation of rules. Rules, being inherently 
over- and underinclusive, create hard cases. Individualists value this 
hardness. Altruists do not, but nevertheless formulate and apply rules 
when pursuing broader strategies. 
This is a comparatively narrow point in the broad-ranging con­
text of Form and Substance. Yet Kennedy gives it pride of place. 
One wonders why, given that Kennedy does not advance to these "in­
herent" values of rules and standards as essential explanations of ac­
tual decisionmaker behavior. Political transformation is a plausible 
explanation. Kennedy lets us know that he prefers standards to rules, 
just as he prefers altruism to individualism. In a harmonious world, 
he says, no rules would be needed. 53 When he makes a list of contra­
dictory pairs of values-one value associated with rules and an oppo­
site number associated with standards-we infer that he privileges the 
values associated with standards over those associated with rules. For 
example, we infer that Kennedy would privilege the value of "flexibil­
ity ," associated with standards, over the "neutrality" of rules. He 
would privilege the "creativity" brought to the application of stan­
dards over the "precision" associated with the rules. He would privi­
lege the "spontaneity" of standards over the "certainty" of rules, and 
so on. 54 Thus does Form and Substance advance a notion of stan­
dards over rules as an aspirational benchmark to promote better 
decisionmaking. 
This aspirational jurisprudence of standards can be related sub­
stantively to the political jurisprudence of other CLS writers. It 
52 Id. at 1 776. 
5 3  Id.  at 1 746. 
54 Id.  at 1 7 1 1 - 1 2 . 
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manifests the concept of destabilization. 55 According to Professor 
Roberto Unger, destabilization serves the ultimate goals of loosening 
the hold the status quo has on our consciousnesses and freeing up our 
imaginations for the creation of a new, less structured and ordered 
society. He would realize these aspirations through an "expanded 
-doctrine" containing a system of "destabilization rights" exercised by 
the community against entrenched individuals and institutions. 
Among other things, this system would substitute a centrally adminis­
tered "rotating capital fund" for the present system of market and 
property rights. 56 The destabilization idea is manifested throughout 
CLS private law scholarship. For example, CLS writers take special 
pains to debunk certainty rationales. 57 Certainty rationales stem from 
the antithetical idea that social and economic stability has an overrid­
ing value. Kennedy's equation of rules with individualism and stan­
dards with altruism similarly manifests the destabilization idea. 
Rules stabilize things by making outcomes more certain; therefore, 
they get a negative connotation. Standards destabilize things by ex­
panding the range of possible outcomes; therefore, they get a positive 
connotation. 
Once placed in this broader political framework, Kennedy's "in­
herent" values of form seem unlikely to figure into the private law 
conceptions of those not sharing Kennedy's politics. Only those at­
tracted by the proposition that constant destabilization leads to 
achievement of the greatest possible degree of collective social benefits 
will pursue standards for their own sake. And even for those pursu­
ing destabilization, contract law hardly seems the body of doctrine 
most urgently in need of treatment. Post-Realist contract law privi­
leges standards over rules. Surviving classical rules tend to be formu­
lated and applied in standardlike ways. These days, one would do 
better to look to the jurisprudence of socialism than to the benign 
jurisprudence of contract for legal structures riddled with the cold 
individualism of rules. 58 
55 For a discussion of the destabilizing effect of selecting fonn over rules, see Shupack, 
supra note 40, at 962-65.  
5 6 Unger, supra note 9,  at 602- 1 6. 
57 See, e.g. ,  the critique of "adaptationist" legal scholarship in Gordon, Historicism in 
Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1 0 1 7 ,  1 028-37 ( 1 9 8 1 ), or the description of the "modest real­
ist" responding to the CLS political theories by insisting on specific progmmmatic suggestions 
in Frug, supra note 45, at 1 3 84--85 .  
5 8 The CLS attack on certainty rationales having been discussed, one final caveat should be 
mentioned. This critique works well when directed to individualist judicial decisionmaking. 
Certainty rhetoric covers individualist impulses where deeper understanding of the relation­
ship would show that an altruistic decision would not cause suboptimal or other undesirable 
behavior. See Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Con'Jertible Bonds, 1 984 Wis. L. 
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III. MET APOLITICS 
Legal academics outside CLS can encounter Kennedy's contract 
critique, and all its stated and unstated radical political assumptions 
and assertions, and emerge with a renewed commitment to the "lib­
eral legalism" CLS attacks. Denial, hostility, or other defensive 
weapons need not be taken up despite Kennedy's challenge to do so. 
Instead, the encounter can be treated as an occasion for constructive 
political self-examination. 59 Some observations follow on Kennedy's 
function as a character-building exercise for legal academics outside 
CLS. These observations build on a comparative political analysis of 
the treatments of contract paternalism of Kennedy and Kronman. 
A. Kennedy's Political Challenge 
We can develop a working, albeit simplified, picture of Ken­
nedy's political challenge by hypothesizing a legal academic reader 
encountering Kennedy's treatment of paternalism in contract. In Pa­
ternalism, Kennedy advances an expansive notion of acceptable pater­
nalist intervention in private relations. 60 In the process, he runs up 
against a number of liberal assumptions often made by legal academ­
ics. 61 He starts with an unobjectionable and broad definition: 
"[P]aternalist interventions involve overruling the preferences of the 
beneficiary in his own best interest."62 He then surveys contract doc­
trine to show that paternalism beneficently motivates much case law 
customarily explained by reference to concepts of "fairness."63 Thus, 
he groups consideration cases, good faith cases, and reliance cases to­
gether with the more obviously paternalistic cases involving capacity, 
unconscionability, and non wai vable duties like implied warranties. 64 
Rev. 667. It by no means follows that certainty should perish as a jurisprudential considera­
tion, at least in the work of those who do not subscribe to destabilization politics. For pur­
poses of dealing with private relationships in the world as it stands now and for the immediate 
future, certainty counts because people desire it. The exercise of valuing an uncertain stream 
of future payments confirms this lesson. The practicing lawyer whose client is investing a 
substantial sum in a transaction seeks certainty because his client wants it; he is not using it as 
a front for individualistic values. And while he knows very well that perfect certainty cannot 
be obtained, adequate legal certainty is his stock in trade. 
59 A growing responsive jurisprudence can be drawn upon for assistance. For responses to 
the critique of contract law, see C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obli­
gation ( 1 98 1 ); Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1 9 8 5  Wis. L 
Rev. 483. For general jurisprudence, see, e.g. ,  Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L 
Rev. 739 ( 1 982); Johnson, supra note 3. 
60 Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 645. 
6 1 Id. at 645-46. 
62 Id. at 572. 
6 3 Id. at 624-38. 
64 Id. at 624-29, 632-36. 
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Kennedy presents his doctrinal analysis most persuasively. It 
even succeeds in overcoming some of our hypothetical academic 
reader's ingrained individualist hostility to the idea of a contracts ju­
risprudence motivated by paternalism. But the reader's concessions 
to Kennedy will have substantial political implications. Granting the­
oretical sanction to aggressive judicial altruism in the aid of the dis­
abled opens a "principled" doctrinal path to all manner of radical 
reordering of private economic relations. Kennedy drives home the 
point with a radical suggestion: If he were a decisionmaker, he would 
favor "an adventurous and experimental program of left-wing com­
pulsory terms."65 He shows us what he has in mind by pulling out 
United Steel Workers, Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp. , 66 a case 
frequently discussed in CLS. There the plaintiff steelworkers' union 
unsuccessfully tried to prevent mill closings with a promissory estop­
pel theory. Kennedy, employing a more classical contract device, 
would go farther than that : 
[T)he court should have implied into every contract of employment 
between the company and an individual worker the following term : 
As part payment for the worker's labor, the company promised 
that in the event it wished to terminate the manufacture of steel in 
the plant, it would convey the plant to the union in trust for the 
present workers . . . . The company further impliedly promised 
to condition the conveyance so that if the union as trustee at­
tempted to sell the plant or convert it to a use that would substan­
tially reduce the economic benefit it generated for the town, the 
town would become the owner in fee simple. 67 
This proposal creates a problem for our hypothetical academic 
reader. She has found Kennedy's treatment of paternalism persuasive 
up to this point, but now balks. She finds that the usual resort to 
treatises and reporters to formulate a conventional counterargument 
grounded in "contract law principles" no longer works. Kennedy has 
demonstrated to her that these principles are inconsistent and indeter­
minate. Furthermore, Kennedy has taught her to relate her own legal 
consciousness to the world view underlying it. She finds her assump­
tion of the inevitability and necessity of social arrangements in con­
formity with the doctrine underlying the argument from the doctrine. 
Well-schooled in the critique, she sees that the doctrinal argument 
unsuccessfully attempts to legitimate these social arrangements non-
65 Id. at 629-30. 
66 492 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ohio 1 980), atfd in part, vacated and remanded i n  part, 63 1 F . 2d 
1 264 (6th Cir.  1 9 80); see Fei nman, supra note 9, at 8 5 8-59. 
67 Kennedy,  Paternalism, supra note 7 ,  at 630. 
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ideologically, 68 and that the determinate consciousness can be 
changed. Thus deprived of the usual autonomous legal defenses, she 
must admit to a desire that the steel company's management and 
shareholders have the leftover assets and must scrutinize the political 
and social assumptions underlying this desire. Defending the corpo­
ration will require a lot of.work: She must advance principles to jus­
tify a substantial segment of the economic and social status quo. 
This hypothetical encounter shows Kennedy at his salubrious 
best, challenging those in the legal academy who defend existing insti­
tutions without seriously considering alternative arrangements. Stan­
dard lawyerly objections to proposals for change based on the 
"burden of persuasion" concept ring hollow in the face of Kennedy's 
critique. The academy is not a court. Those in it do not decide cases. 
They only discuss them. All academics ought to bear the burden of 
persuas10n. 
Let us hypothesize a second academic reader of Kennedy's Pater­
nalism . This reader seeks persuasively to demonstrate the wrongful­
ness of Kennedy's expansive notions of paternalism and plans to look 
beyond contract case law to higher political and social values in order 
to do so. If this reader seeks to build this argument on notions of 
freedom and autonomy, he will find excellent material in the exposi­
tion of the metaprinciple of individualism in Form and Substance.  He 
can start by using Kennedy to confirm the moral basis of 
individualism: 
The notion of self-reliance has a strong affirmative moral content, 
the demand for respect for the rights of others. This means that 
the individualist ethic is as demanding in its way as the counter­
ethic of altruism. It involves the renunciation of the use of both 
private and public force in the struggle for satisfaction, and acqui­
escence in the refusal of others to behave in a communal fashion. 69 
The reader can then draw on Kennedy-on-individualism to warn of 
the dangers of statist impositions of community values: 
Thus, if the state is only an instrument each party adopts to 
achieve his individual purposes, it is hard to see how it would ever 
make sense to set up state processes founded on the notions of 
changing or developing values. If the state is truly only a means to 
values, and all values are inherently arbitrary and subjective, the 
only legitimate state institutions are facilitative. The instant the 
68 For Kennedy on the legitimating function of doctrine, see Kennedy, Paternalism, supra 
note 7, at 604, 62 1 .  For a general discussion of the CLS critique of the legitimating functions 
of legal consciousness, see Trubek, supra note 3 ,  at 5 9 5 - 600. 
69 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 7 1 5 ; see also id. at 1 7 1 6  (discussing 
common justifications for self-interest). 
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state adopts change or development of values as a purpose, we will 
suspect that it does so in opposition to certain members whose val­
ues other members desire to change. The state then becomes not a 
means to the ends of all, but an instrument of some in their strug-
gle with others, supposing that those others desire to retain and 
pursue their disfavored purposes.70 
While conceding that Kennedy's paternalist position has a cer­
tain misguided sincerity behind it, the reader can cite to Kennedy-on­
altruism to demonstrate the position's implicit totalitarianism. Patent 
dangers to individual freedom lie behind the following altruistic 
statement: 
We can achieve real freedom only collectively, through group self­
determination. We are simply too weak to realize ourselves in iso­
lation. True, collective self-determination, short of utopia, implies 
the use of force against the individual. But we experience and ac­
cept the use of physical and psychic coercion every day, in family 
life, education and culture. 7 1  
The reader can then shift back to  Kennedy-on-individualism for 
a passionate climax: "So long as others are, to some degree, independ­
ent and unknowable beings, the slogan of shared values carries a real 
threat of a tyranny more oppressive than alienation in an at least 
somewhat altruistic liberal state. "72 
Unfortunately for the reader, this turning of Kennedy on Ken­
nedy will not conclusively rebut or disprove Kennedy's points on pa­
ternalism. Kennedy understands the rhetoric of freedom well and 
anticipates all the standard counterpoints in Paternalism . He sees the 
good in contemporary society, even taking the trouble to commend 
the democratic achievements of late capitalist culture. 73 Form and 
Substance and Paternalism, moreover, are radical only in their impli­
cations and, thus, present elusive objects for political attack. They in 
terms suggest only that private law be reshaped to privilege altruistic 
meta principles over individualistic ones. 74 No fundamental restruc-
70 Id. at 1 770. 
7 1 Id. at 1 774. Kennedy here is constructing a paradigmatically altruist argument. The 
problem of perpetual contradiction, he says, is that we simultaneously believe in both the indi­
vidualist and altruist sets of premises. Id. at 1 774-76. 
7 2 Id. at 1 77 5 .  Here Kennedy recounts an individualistic argument for freedom. The CLS 
notion of freedom is somewhat different. H utchinson and Monahan describe it as a belief that 
each individual must be left free from constraints of inhibiting consciousness. See Hutchinson 
& Monahan, supra note 4, at 229-30. 
7 3 See Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7,  at 578 ("There is a sense in which there has 
never been a culture more the conscious and intelligent product of the mass of people--a more 
democratic culture-than that of late capital ism."). 
74 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7 ,  at 1 777-7 8 .  
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turing of anyone's life by some threatening new state is advocated.75 
For that matter, Kennedy's communitarian aspirations do not neces­
sarily entail implementation by a big state. 
Our hypothetical readers would be well-advised to modify their 
objectives respecting Kennedy. 76 The first reader's conscientiousness 
will prevent her from claiming that any single set of principles pro­
vides the basis for a complete defense of the political and economic 
status quo. Similarly, the second reader eventually will find himself 
engaging Kennedy on a level of abstraction on which Kennedy cannot 
be "proven" wrong in any meaningful sense. But both safely can 
abandon these absolutist lines of argument. They can redirect atten­
tion to the formulation of accounts of the differences between Ken­
nedy's politics and their own. This exercise should lead to political 
"refutations" of Kennedy and provide a basis for the extraction of 
those elements of Kennedy's critique not wholly constituted of his 
politics. 
B .  Comparing the Critical and Liberal Approaches-Kennedy and 
Kronman on Paternalism 
Comparing Professor Anthony Kronman's recent article on pa­
ternalism in contract law77 with Kennedy's precedent treatment of the 
same subject matter provides a basis for anticipating the directions to 
be taken by new theories concerning private law78 that combine liber-
75 But cf. Unger, supra note 9 (the constructive outcome of a critique of objectivism is to 
lead to a search for alternative institutional forms). 
76 Strangely, Kennedy should present less of a political challenge to a radical conservative 
than to a rights-oriented liberal. Kennedy's point that law is a "radically underdetennined" 
product of consciousness rather than a manifestation of a rational theory might have a liberat­
ing effect on an extreme individualist. To this reader Kennedy may suggest a theoretical alter­
native to the economists' problematic project of explaining and restating law as a rational 
elaboration of the efficiency metaprinciple. See supra note 28. Once having accepted Ken­
nedy's vision of conflicting thought structures and motivations, he or she can wage a new kind 
of war against entrenched socialist institutions. So long as socialist institutions are the objec­
tives of the attack, "destabilization" will not seem an unattractive political goal. To advance 
the attack, he or she may follow Kennedy's advice and work on a rhetoric attuned as closely as 
possible to the individualist strain that dominates American consciousness. 
Fortunately for the cause of communitarianism, this is an improbable scenario. One is 
unlikely to encounter this hypothetical individualist in  the contemporary legal academy. Most 
American individualists also are conservatives who believe in the inevitability and rightness of 
certain notions. They are unlikely to find Kennedy's structuralist critique persuasive. 
77 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 10. 
78 The more highly developed literature of response to the CLS critique of constitutional 
law scholarship affords concepts useful in the defense of contract. The notion of i nterpretive 
community-that the community's shared interpretation provides law with objectives apart 
from individual consciousness, see Fiss, supra note 59 (discussed in H utchinson & Monahan, 
supra note 4, at 207 n .35}-also mediates between assertions of contract law as politics and 
contract law as autonomous rationality. We can adopt this concept and characterize post-
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alism with cognizance of, and respect for, the principal elements of 
Kennedy's critique. It should be noted that Kronman's Paternalism 
does not directly address Kennedy's treatment.79 Even so, an implicit 
dialogue between the two works emerges from the exercise of 
companson. 
1 . Scholarly Perspectives and Political Objectives 
Kennedy and Kronman start with the same notion of paternal­
ism80 and then go off in different directions. Kennedy breaks down 
doctrinally based preconceptions to demonstrate paternalism's signifi­
cant role as a motivational force in contract law decisionmaking. 
Kronman restricts himself to the small body of contract doctrine gen­
erally acknowledged for its paternalism-rules that restrict "the lib­
erty to bind oneself by making a legally enforceable promise."8 1 
Kronman then divides this doctrine into three categories for separate 
examination. Like Kennedy, Kronman seeks to "explain" this doctri­
nal subject matter by reference to ideas from outside. But Kronman's 
explanatory discourse draws on a different body of ideas and pursues 
a different goal. Kennedy, it will be recalled, explains doctrine by 
isolating the ideas that motivate decisionmakers. Kronman bypasses 
this inquiry into ideological causation and undertakes an ex post ra­
tionalization and justification of doctrine in the treatises. He seeks to 
set forth ideas that make the doctrine good doctrine, rather than set 
forth ideas that put the doctrine there in the first place. In effect, he 
reconstructs and transforms the doctrine by discarding the deci­
sionmaker's theoretical explanation and substituting a new and im-
Realist contract law as a community settlement of various individualist/altruist conflicts, 
marked out in rules and standards, effective for the time being, and always open to critique in 
response to changes in our economic and social structure. While areas of individualist/altruist 
conflict continue to exist, their parameters have been marked out by gentlemanly truces among 
the combatants. 
This characterization meets only a small part of the critique, however. In a sense it as­
serts only that something is there in contract law, a point no one disputes. Once we accept that 
the thought structure exists, the question arises of the extent to which it determines behavior. 
This depends on the extent of the community agreement. Kennedy would admit, for example, 
a general consensus that reliance can provide a basis for enforcing promises. But he would go 
on to assert that the community would fail to agree on the application of the idea in most 
cases. For further discussion, see Yablon, supra note 5, at 93 1 -36. Thereafter comes the ques­
tion whether the interpretive community's principles, whatever their state of confusion, possess 
moral legitimacy. 
· 
79 Kronman cites to Kennedy's Paternalism twice during the course of his article. 
Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 765 n. \ 4, 7 8 1  n.60. 
80 Kronman says: "[A)ny legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground that it would be 
contrary to the actor's own welfare is paternalistic." I d. at 763. Compare Kennedy's notion in 
the text accompanying note 62 supra. 
8 1  Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 764. 
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proved set of constitutive ideas. In so doing, Kronman adopts a 
flexible posture, avoiding the jurisprudential model in which each case 
must give rise to a single correct answer. 82 He proposes only a "most 
plausible justification"83 for each of his categories of paternalist doc­
trine. In this manner, Kronman keeps outside of the range of many 
standard CLS criticisms. 
The ideological underpinnings and objectives of Kronman's 
treatment are liberal: 
One who believes, as Mill did and I do, that some paternalistic 
restrictions on contractual freedom are not only permissible but 
morally required, must supply a standard or principle for evaluat­
ing paternalistic arguments in particular cases; only in this way can 
the legitimacy of paternalism be established and its limits 
defined. 84 
This liberal profession carries an implicit rejection of Kennedy's 
images of law and society. Ideas explaining and justifying contract 
doctrine in the sense Kronman promises cannot be comprised of and 
determined by Kennedy's perpetual contradiction. But Kronman 
must keep theory substantially separate from practice, even as he 
keeps himself free from the perpetual contradiction. He advances 
"principle[s] for evaluating paternalistic arguments,"85 but makes no 
concomitant claims that these principles have determined decision­
making in the past or can or should be expected to determine deci­
sions in the future. Their most likely future employment lies within 
an ongoing theoretical critique of judicial practice. 
Kronman implicitly accepts, or at least makes no attempt to 
deny, Kennedy's points that doctrine does not determine the results of 
cases and that the cases cannot consistently be read together. But he 
implicitly rejects the idea that delegitimation follows from recognition 
of inconsistency and indeterminacy. He purports to evaluate and le­
gitimate paternalism in contract, but does not also purport to con-
82 See Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53  N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 ( 1 978).  
83  Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 765 . 
84 ld. 
85  ld. Under this view, judicial decisionmaking ripens into fullest legitimacy only upon 
theoretical reconsideration in the academy. The judge does the practical work, exercising 
what Richards calls "competence at critical evaluation. "  Richards, The Theory of Adjudica­
tion and the Task of the Great Judge, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 7 1 ,  1 79 ( 1 979). The academic 
performs the more theoretical exercise of articulating the operative principles behind the judg­
ment, what Richards calls "critical self-consciousness."  I d. at 1 7 8-80. This approach deem­
phasizes the theoretical significance of the judicial opinion. The opinion serves only to 
discipline the judge in the exercise of critical evaluation, assuring that the judge goes beyond 
intuition to apply deliberative rationality. Theoretical authoritativeness tends to be achieved 
only upon academic reconsideration. See Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 10, at 790. 
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struct a rational system enclosing all judicial practice. By proceeding 
in this limited way, Kronman implicitly asserts that irrationalities in 
the decisionmaking process need not prevent the decisionmaker's ac­
tion from being followed by rational and legitimating theoretical 
discourse. 86 
2. Doctrinal Discussion 
There follow more particular comparisons of Kennedy and 
Kronman on paternalistic contract doctrine. The comparisons show 
that despite their conflicting theoretical conceptions, Kennedy and 
Kronman have similar things to say about practical matters, both 
doctrinal and political. 
We start with Kronman's first category of paternalistic contract 
doctrine. This includes cases imposing nonwaivable contract duties 
such as the implied warranty of habitability. 
Here Kennedy and Kronman converge on the famous redistribu­
tion model devised by Bruce Ackerman. 87 Kronman accepts it with a 
mild empirical caveat. 88 Kennedy accepts it with a strong empirical 
caveat. 89 Then they diverge. Kennedy goes on to add his overlay of 
altruism and individualism, predictably finding altruistic motivations 
behind the doctrine of nonwaivability. Interestingly, Kennedy does 
not let his theories about decisionmaking or his scruples regarding the 
empirical intractability of efficiency determinations prevent him from 
including a few practical observations about how cases might be de­
cided. It often "makes sense," he says, to proceed to a redistributive 
result based on "rough intuitive assessments" of the economic vari­
ables.90 Throw in a paternalistic intuition, and "there may be a strong 
case for intervention even with sketchy information and a lot of 
uncertainty. ' '9 1 
Kronman turns rightward to add a second best efficiency theory 
to redistribution as another equally good, justification. Free bargain­
ing over contract terms would produce the most efficient result in a 
perfect world. But we inhabit an imperfect world in which a regime 
of free bargaining between landlords and tenants could result in ram­
pant irremediable fraud by landlords keeping quiet about hidden de­
fects in leased premises. Thus, in our imperfect world, nonwaivable 
86 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 765.  
87 See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor:  Of Housing 
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale L.J. I 093 ( 197 1 ) . 
88 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 772. 
89 Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7,  at 6 1 1 - 1 3 .  
90 Id. a t  6 1 4. 
9 1 Id. 
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duties may turn out to be the most efficient approach available.92 Pre­
sumably, Kronman knows that Kennedy's Paternalism makes much 
of the empirical hazards of just this sort of transaction-cost jurispru­
dence.93 Yet Kronman goes ahead, albeit without empirical proof, 
offering an intuitive economic hypothesis as a "best" explanation. 
Decisionmaker motivations do not, in terms, enter into his discussion. 
Kronman's second category of paternalistic contract rules in­
cludes those restricting contracts of peonage and those restricting 
waivers of the right to engage in a particular profession, obtain a dis­
charge in bankruptcy, or institute a divorce action.94 Kennedy finds 
these rules necessary even though the individuals they purport to pro­
tect act voluntarily. False consciousness afflicts these people; the pe­
onage rule manifests an altruistic objection to slavery as a way of 
life. 95 
Kronman's explanation looks very different at first. He tries out 
a distribution theory, but finds it inappropriate.96 He then experi­
ments with an efficiency theory. But he finds this "unsatisfying."97 
Finally, he turns to contract doctrine, in particular the standards re­
stricting specific performance decrees. He draws out an insight into 
the meaning of the concept of self-enslavement. The limitations on 
specific performance protect the promisor's right to "depersonalize" 
the contract relationship by buying his way out. We protect this right 
because the alternative mode of enforcement, forced performance of 
the promise, would threaten the promisor's integrity or self-respect. 
This rationale, says Kronman, explains this category of prohibi-
92 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 767-fJ9. Kronman's intuitions about the 
workings of relations between landlords and tenants differ from my own.  I doubt that land­
lords of low-income urban housing spend much energy on fraudulent concealment of defects in 
leased premises. And I would guess that most cases of tenants withholding rent involve 
problems either arising after the start of the lease or visible at the start of the lease. The classic 
cases involve facilities breaking down through use over time. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty 
Corp., 428 F.2d 1 07 1  (D.C. Cir.) (unclear when defect arose), cert. denied, 400 U.S.  925 
( 1 970); Green v. Superior Court, 1 0  Cal. 3d 6 1 6, 5 1 7  P.2d 1 1 68 ,  I l l  Cal. Rptr. 704 ( 1 974) 
(failure to maintain); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 1 30, 265 A.2d 526 ( 1 970) (toilet cracked two 
months after lease began); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1 968) (defects at 
the start of the lease of which the tenant was informed). 
93 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 765 n . 1 4, 7 8 1  n.60. 
94 Id. at 775. 
95 See Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 627-28. 
96 Distributive rules insure fair distribution of scarce material resources, while the rules in 
Kronman's second category concern personal liberty. See Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 
1 0, at 775.  
97 The theory makes the prohibition a "second best" device to avoid fraud and duress. The 
problem, says Kronman, is that he would bar these contracts even where clearly uncoerced. 
ld. at 777. 
------m>J)Qr:JJ 
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tions. 98 As an overlay, he adds a fair distinction between different 
types of breaching promisors. Some breach out of mere "disappoint­
ment" with the course of events taken by an otherwise soundly con­
ceived transaction. Others, including breaching promisors in the 
second category, undergo a change in their entire system of values 
that causes them to "regret" the whole relationship.99 Enforcement 
against the latter promisors would intensify their feelings of self-be­
trayal and lack of self-respect and, thus, is avoided. 1 00  
At least in  one sense, Kennedy and Kronman here offer different 
versions of the same explanation. Kronman's conception of this doc­
trine as a product of concern for the self-respect of others is a finely 
wrought manifestation of Kennedy's altruism metaprinciple. But by 
justifying altruistic intervention in terms of "integrity" and "self-re­
spect'' rather than "false consciousness," Kronman also engages indi­
vidualist sensibilities. 1 0 1  Kronman even defends his concept with a 
Kantian moral assertion: The moral community respects the integrity 
of its individual members. Kronman's concept of respect for the ben­
eficiary's self-respect in a sense looks to the fusion of Kennedy's per­
petual contradiction. Kennedy, in response, doubtless would point to 
the illusory nature of any such "fusion." Vague concepts such as this 
never determine the results of real cases; no amount of theorizing 
along such lines will eradicate all the individual alienation in this 
world. For a rejoinder, a defender of Kronman can assert that indi­
vidual alienation at least will be diminished somewhat in a world in 
which such theorizing informs legal practices. 
This implicit critical/liberal debate intensifies with comparison 
of the articles' treatments of Kronman's third category of legal doc­
trine. This category includes the limitations on enforcement of 
promises made by infants and other incompetent persons. 
Here Kennedy turns his critical sights to the old free will expla­
nation of incapacity. This justification, he says, never was consis­
tently applied. The doctrine made some contracts void, but others 
merely voidable. It therefore fails for incoherence. What we really 
have is ad hoc loving intervention by the courts to protect people 
from their own false consciousness. "People are idiots ," he says. 1 02 
Furthermore, no principled antipaternalism can exist: "There is no 
objective way to fix the content of paternalist intervention, if by 'ob-
n ld. at 778-79. 
99 ld. at 780-8 1 .  
1 00  Id. at 779-83.  
1 0 1  Kennedy places respect for the rights of others at the core of his concept of individual­
ism. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 7, at 1 7 1 3 . 
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jective' ':"e mean a r.nethod of judgment without judgment." 103 Both 
paternalism and antipaternalism must be ad hoc. And, as between ad 
hoc paternalist intervention and ad hoc restraint, Kennedy prefers ad 
hoc intervention, despite the attendant risk of arbitrary action.  Given 
subjectively motivated intervention, says Kennedy, we can ameliorate 
the risk of arbitrary action by encouraging decisonmakers to reflect 
on what constitutes a responsible exercise of judgment. 104 
Kronman endeavors to construct the principled antipaternalism 
that Kennedy asserts to be impossible. The capacity rules, says 
Kronman, serve the purpose of encouraging sound judgment in a set 
of special cases where the promisor's capacity to judge is impaired. 
He has in mind a Kantian model of judgment: 105 Judgment involves 
critical reflection on one's interests and desires and requires distance 
from them. It does not involve the instrumental rationality of choos­
ing means to ends. It is rather the intuitive, deliberative exercise of 
choosing the best ends. It requires strength, sobriety, disinterested­
ness and dispassion. It is "the capacity to form an imaginative con­
ception of the moral consequences of a proposed course of action and 
to anticipate its effect on one's character." 106 Capacity doctrines pa­
ternalistically protect people unable to achieve this act of 
disengagement. 
Here, once again, Kronman offers an altruistic explanation, but 
deploys altruism differently than does Kennedy. Where Kennedy 
brushes off the protected promisor as an idiot with false consciousness 
and focuses on the emotional makeup of the decisionmaker, Kronman 
focuses on the emotional makeup of the promisor and looks there for 
a reason sufficient to justify the release of the decisionmaker's altruis­
tic impulses. 1 07 Kronman believes that reasons can control motiva-
I 03 ld. at 638 .  
I 04 Id .  a t  636-38. Kennedy suggests that fiduciary duties and contract gap-filling tech­
niques also can be relied upon to keep decisionmakers in check. This is a peculiar suggestion, 
given Kennedy's Yiews on the indeterminacy of doctrine. Perhaps we should understand it as 
instrumentalist argumentation. 
1 05 See I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 47-59 (L. Beck trans. 1 959). 
Richards explicates the Kantian model of impartial deliberation for the contemporary audi­
ence and applies it to legitimate the process of adjudication. Richards, supra note 85, at 
1 82-85, 205- 1 5 .  
1 06 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, a t  790. 
1 07 Kronman anticipates Kennedy's standard inconsistency objection. This would be that 
contract law does nothing to protect legions of promisors with impaired judgment who fal l  
outside of the narrow capacity categories. Kronman answers that our society is sparing with 
paternalistic intervention because such intervention is antidemocratic. We leave individuals 
free to pursue their own perceptions of the good so " long as they do not violate the rights of 
others." I d. at 794-95.  
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tions; Kennedy does not because he does not believe that neutral 
modes of rational discourse really exist. 
3 .  Judgment and Legitimacy 
Those defending the legitimacy of law and the legal process 
against charges of indeterminacy and incoherence sometimes advance 
the possiblity of sound decisionmaking in the individual case. This, 
they say, ameliorates the failure of the body of law as a whole to stand 
up to rigorous analytical inspection. Llewellyn theorized about judi­
cial "situation sense" and "singing reason." 108 Cardozo thought along 
similar lines respecting good judging in a world of free choice: 
There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to 
call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to 
thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more 
than other mortals. All their lives, forces which they do not recog­
nize and cannot name, have been tugging at them-inherited in­
stincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant 
is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs, a sense in 
James's phrase of "the total push and pressure of the cosmos, " 
which, when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where 
choice shall fall .  109 
More recent literature offers notions of judicial "psychological matur­
ity" 1 10 and "political astuteness" 1 1 1  to justify the irrationality in our 
system of legal ideas. In his Paternalism, Kronman contributes to 
this line of thinking, and with a formulation apparently responsive to 
the CLS critique. He suggests that his concept of judgment might be 
extended beyond an evaluation of contracting parties to an evaluation 
of judges. 1 1 2 
The judge, says Kronman, must "striv[e] to be objective." 1 13 He 
must separate himself from his immediate desires, 1 14 and r.tdopt a 
point of view above that of the parties. This is a condition indispen-
108 K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 6 1 ,  1 2 1-57 ( 1 960). 
I 09 B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 1 2  ( 192 1 ) .  Professor Richard Weisberg 
explains Cardozo's conception of the role of culture in judicial decisionmaking and of decision­
making in the culture: " [C]ulture involves more; it is the trained sense in the adjudicator of the 
common perception of the surrounding society, not so much in its ideal as in its actual form 
. .  " Weisberg, Law, Literature, and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, I Cardozo L. Rev. 283,  
302 ( 1 979). 
I I O Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 4, at 205. 
1 1 ' Johnson, supra note 3,  at 2i9.  For a CLS critique of this approach, see Mensch, supra 
note 25, at 32-34. 
' 1 2 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 790--94. 
1 1 3 Id. at 792. 
1 14 But not from his deepest interests. See id. at 792-93; see also Richards, supra note 85, at 
1 7 1 ,  208-09 (discussing separation from Kant ian perspective). 
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sible to attaining "even a small measure of objectivity."  1 1 5 
Kronman's proposal accepts the subjectivist CLS point that law is a 
product of the consciousness of lawmakers. But Kronman does not 
concede that the lawmaker's subjective motivation must operate un­
regulated by ideas from outside his person. While wholly objective 
decisionmaking may not exist, objectivity is a state of mind to which 
legal decisionmakers should aspire. The decisionmaker who strives to 
separate his own desires from his judgments can achieve objectivity in 
some degree. In so striving, the decisionmaker shows respect for 
others. By implication, this decisionmaker thereby exercises his 
power so as to protect other individuals, and achieves legitimacy. 
A concept of judgment also figures into Kennedy's Paternalism . 
It closes with a vision of legitimate private law and legitimate deci­
sionmaking. Kennedy's vision is shaped by his idea that deci­
sionmaker motivations determine outcomes and by his commitment 
to a transformative politics. Peaceful coexistence between the idea 
and the commitment requires Kennedy to find ways to guide and dis­
cipline decisionmakers. He recommends transformative political ac­
tion in the form of intensified paternalistic decisionmaker 
intervention. But he recognizes that paternalistic decisionmaking has 
the potential for aggressively damaging human dignity. He relies on 
conscientious exercises of judgment to overcome this difficulty. His 
prescription looks quite liberal at first inspection: "The truth of the 
matter is that what we need when we make decisions affecting the 
well-being of other people is correct intuition about their needs and an 
attitude of respect for their autonomy. Nothing else will help." 1 1 6 
But resemblance fades as the observer becomes acquainted with 
Kennedy's belief that "correct intuition" ultimately must be achieved 
intuitively. To Kennedy, some intuitions about the needs of others 
are better informed than others. The decisionmaker with "lived inter­
subjectivity," that is, common experience, with the object of his or her 
paternalist intervention, has "real knowledge" on which to base his or 
her intuitions. This "lived intersubjectivity" can be achieved only in 
small spiritually cohesive communities. 1 1 7 In larger communities, 
decisionmakers at best can act on "verbal models" derived from the 
intersubjective experiences of others. 1 1 8 
I 1 5 Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 1 0, at 792. 
1 1 6 Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 646. 
I 1 7  Small communities are central to the metapolitical vision current among some CLS writ­
ers. See Frug, supra note 45, at 1 295-96, 1 384-86. 
I 1 8 Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 639. Once acting on a derivative verbal model, 
Kennedy's intersubjective judge bears a resemblance to Rawls' "sympathetic spectator," de­
fined as combining "impartiality, possession of relevant knowledge, and powers of imaginative 
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Comparison of these two concepts of judging shows Kennedy 
and Kronman each constructing conflicting theories with respect to a 
set of common perceptions of the phenomena in the world. Both rec­
ognize the subjective motivations that influence decisionmakers. Both 
think that judgments springing from the unaffected intuitions and un­
regulated impulses of the judge are bad judgments. Both agree that 
good judgments must be based on an understanding of the parties 
judged. 1 1 9 
Kronman adopts these perceptions to the end of protecting the 
individual in a society apparently constituted more or less as we know 
it. He wants the judge to make an imaginative leap into a world of 
ideas about those judged. Presumably, the judge's imaginative con­
ception of the parties operates inside a construct drawn from the hy­
potheses and models of legal doctrine. The judgment remains 
satisfactorily objective so long as the judge keeps his or her own needs 
and desires out of this process of imagining and reasoning. So long as 
decisionmakers impose this self-discipline, individual autonomy can 
have some protection against community invasion. 
Kennedy adopts a similar view of what goes on when a judgment 
is made according to a different view of human nature. Like 
Kronman, he sees that the individuality of the judge must be kept out 
of the decisionmaking process. But unlike Kronman, he does not be­
lieve that the decisionmaker's personality can be suppressed to any 
significant degree by self-conscious adherence to ideas. Kennedy's in­
tersubjectivity replaces Kronman's objectivity as the means by which 
the decisionmaker's ego is overcome. Common experience with 
others removes the egoistic aspect of actions based on personal moti­
vations and makes good judgment possible. 1 20 
Kennedy's ideal of intersubjective judgment manifests both ex­
treme dissatisfaction with the world he perceives and an optimistic 
belief in the possibilities of changed consciousness and harmony be­
tween individual and community. Kronman's ideal of dispassionate 
judgment acknowledges the world's imperfections more than it 
manifests dissatisfaction with the world; yet it makes no apologies for 
identification . . .  to assure the complete and accurate response of natural sympathy." J .  
Rawls, A Theory of  Justice 1 87 ( 1 97 1 ) . 
1 1 9 See Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 10,  at 792. 
1 20 Both Kennedy and Kronman employ exhortative rhetoric at this stage of the discussion. 
Both act in the common, but rarely recognized, legal academic capacity of preacher to the 
congregation of American decisionmakers. This preaching function follows as a matter of 
course from acknowledgement that the law is not an autonomous rational system. For discus­
sion of the religious aspect of CLS literature and thought, see Johnson, supra note 3,  at 
287-89. 
1 985] MANNERS, METAPRINCIPLES, METAPOLITICS 9 1 3 
the status quo. Like Kennedy's concept, it manifests a belief that con­
sciousness can change. Unlike Kennedy's concept, it manifests the 
view that individuals are bound to live in communities without com­
mon goals and experiences. Conflict being inevitable, individuals can 
achieve a commonality that protects each from the others by subscrib­
ing to common structures of thought. Dispassionate judging makes 
this protective system work. Kennedy is pessimistic respecting the 
efficacy of this sort of protective system and mistrustful of its opera­
tions, even while he is optimistic regarding possibilities for a radically 
changed approach and trustful of those effecting it. Kronman, in con­
trast, is implicitly pessimistic and mistrustful of such utopian visions, 
even while optimistic and trustful when contemplating protective sys­
tems of ideas. 
C. Summary 
Having counterbalanced Kennedy with Kronman, let us return 
to our hypothetical legal academics and their responses to Kennedy. 
We left them moved to ask questions respecting the theories offered to 
legitimate liberal institutions. But both readers resisted Kennedy, for­
mulating challenges to him, even as they admitted the accuracy of 
Kennedy's assertions regarding the explanatory power of doctrine, 
the efficacy of legal reasoning, and the durability of conflict between 
individual and society. 
As it turns out, the process of questioning does not entail conver­
sion to the CLS point of view. While Kennedy destabilizes the read­
ers' assumptions about the inevitability of liberal theories, nothing he 
says disturbs the liberal world views that prompted the theories' con­
struction and provided the theories with ethical content. And, on the 
level of world view, irreconcilable differences separate Kennedy and 
our hypothetical readers. Kennedy and these readers perceive a com­
mon set of imperfections in the world. But they go on to bring differ­
ent moral conceptions to the formulation of their political responses 
to these imperfections: Kennedy more emphatically privileges the al­
leviation of suffering over respect for individual autonomy than do the 
readers. Kennedy and the readers also may perceive the moral consti­
tutions of other people differently, with Kennedy responding more 
trustingly. And they appraise differently the likelihood of breaking 
existing contexts of thought and action, 1 2 1  with Kennedy deeming this 
1 2 1  This phrase comes from D. Trubek, TAKING RIGHTS LIGHTLY?: Radical Voices in 
American Legal Theory 49 (unpublished manuscript based on remarks made at the New 
School for Social Research & Benjamin N.  Cardozo School of Law Lecture in Social Theory, 
Nov. 1 9 , 1 984) (available in Benjamin N.  Cardozo School of Law Library). 
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more easily done. These differences cause the readers to  decline to 
accept CLS's conclusion respecting the legitimacy of law and the ne­
cessity of fundamental political and social transformation, while 
guardedly to accept Kennedy's conception of the law and legal 
theory. 1 22 
This partial acceptance of the CLS critique leaves our hypotheti­
cal academics without a theory affirming the rationality-whether 
present, imminent or future--of our social and political ideas and ar­
rangements. Kennedy has given them a critical awareness of the du­
alisms of Western thought and the irrationalities attending social 
ordering. But the readers remain committed to the idea that individ­
ual autonomy needs protection. Fortunately, the commitment and 
the critical facility can coexist. The readers reassemble themselves as 
perpetual challengers to perpetual contradiction-they strive to over­
come the dualisms of Western thought and achieve a rational order­
ing protective of individual autonomy notwithstanding their shaken 
faith in this goal's attainability. 
Unfortunately, this position carries professional disadvantages. 
Our academics must forego the often successful academic practice of 
propounding theories that explain everything and justify the individ­
ual academic's favorite things. They also must do without the satisfy­
ing belief that their work achieves progress toward practical 
objectives. 
Thus, we leave our hypothetical academics carrying on the mun­
dane academic practice of conscientiously criticizing inferior ideas. 
This result, while problematic, need not be considered unsatisfactory, 
either morally or professionally. Moral satisfaction can come from 
earnest participation in this gradual, probably perpetually uncom-
122 CLS writers have responded negatively to such partial acceptances of their ideas. See 
Frug, supra note 45, at 1 382-86; Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1 4-- 1 5 . 
Frug constructs a type and labels it the "modest realist" legal scholar. Frug, supra note 
45, at 1 384. The type admits the contradictory and incoherent nature of the law. But it other­
wise rejects the critique, putting forward burden of proof arguments, dismissing propositions 
for fundamental change as utopian, and demanding concrete suggestions. The type in fact, 
says Frug, has "absorbed the various bureaucratic theories" into itself and is unable to see the 
difference between the theories and the real world. ld. Frug captures the type nicely. But the 
type captured hardly seems critical at all, and, in any event, is by no means the only partially 
Critical subspecies in the legal academy. 
Gabel and Kennedy have a different way of dealing with partial Criticals. Gabel com­
ments that Johnson accepts the fundamental contradiction, but employs it conservatively. 
· Kennedy responds by recanting the concept, and "the whole idea of individualism and altru­
ism." Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 7,  at 1 5 . This scorched-earth discourse is effective: Gabel 
and Kennedy emerge having kept a clear line between themselves and even the most sympa­
thetic outsiders. Of course, by employing this device, they imply that the ideas in their previ­
ous works are available for partial acceptance. 
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pleted endeavor. 1 23 And, as contract scholars, there remains plenty 
for them to do. 
1 2 3  Even Kennedy accords moral value to the striving academic: "But I honor the attempt 
to subject anarchic sentiment to the test of reason, however happy I may be each time it fails ."  
Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 7, at 624. 
